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The book aims to present an action-research carried out with teachers and educators at
University of Naples “Federico II”: through the research and its results, it is possible to analyze
the nexus and the connections between phenomenology and cognitive sciences, in the training
of the educators, relating to the reflection about the category of intentionality in an educational
key. The intentionality, otherwise the deepest motivation pushing the action, is in fact conceived
as the “motor” of each educational process both for the trainers and for the subject in training.
Specifically, with our contribution, we focus on the three vectors of the phenomenological
inquiry on the category of intentionality: the process of construction, the characteristic of being
implicit, and the intersubjectivity. These three vectors impact on the interiorization and
promotion of ideals like democratic citizenship, global sensivity, and multiculturalism in the
process of construction of professional identity, particularly in the field of education and of the
formation of the educators. These three vectors are intended in the framework of the
neurophenomenological perspective, which aims to put together the philosophical inquiry with
the research in cognitive sciences. However, the purpose is to explore the consequences of this
conjunction on the pedagogical reflection on the concept of educational intentionality,
empirically showing how they influence the metacognitive processes of teachers and educators
during their training course. In order to evaluate empirically how teachers and educators would
develop metacogntive reflections about their professional identities and about their potential
and their opportunities to promote ideals in the children education, we adopt mixed
methodologies of research, using a structured questionnaire and the first-person narratives. The
data gathered with these two instruments are analyzed in a comparative way to find out
indications and directions to follow about the enactive implicit and co-evolutive dimensions of
the training of the facilitators and educators.
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To Andrea, Guglielmo and Marco
Making the decision to have a child -it is 
momentous. It is to decide forever to have 
your heart go walking around outside your 
body.
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Introduction
The research experience described in this book stems from an attempt to com-
bine the search for pedagogical education theories and practices with the frame-
work of neurophenomenology.
Many of the theoretical and empirical studies related to linking cognitive/
educational processes underline the difficulty of successfully applying educa-
tion and related suggestions generated by experiments carried out in laborato-
ries. Indeed, a direct transfer of the acquisitions of neuroscience to educational 
practice and/or teaching seems impractical, while the most suitable method ap-
pears to be an interdisciplinary approach to the study of cognitive processes in 
educational contexts.
In a cross-disciplinary context, then, the educational sciences can relate to 
the cognitive sciences on a plurality of levels connected to as many heuristic 
targets using a pedagogical approach. When, for example, one refers to research 
on epistemologies and professional teachers and educators, a social pedagog-
ical approach is used; when the cognitive and emotional processes underlying 
student antisocial behaviour are addressed or when the purposes and means of 
citizenship education are considered, a special education or disciplinary teach-
ing approach is used. The goal is to investigate the dynamics underlying the 
learning processes and related difficulties in schools and formal educational 
institutions.
In this area of research alone, interest in the results accrued in the cognitive 
sciences has marked a turning point in relation to teaching practices in academ-
ia. Of particular interest are contributions that, given the role that emotions/
learning play in teaching and training strategies, have centred on motivational 
processes and are built using divergent languages.
The research work undertaken here, between a pedagogical approach and a 
general social pedagogical approach, has deepened the problems related to the 
training of teachers and psychologists in relation to their role as educators, a 
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role that requires them to act responsibly and to first consider practices that are 
more useful rather than those that are more effective in terms of educational 
processes.
For example, the transition of the conception of the teacher from an official 
employee to a professional led to a change in the conception of the school and 
the teacher in the last thirty years of the last century, thus leading to the assump-
tion of the model of reflection-in-action – aimed at acquiring the ability to take 
creative solutions and educational awareness and facing situations marked by 
extreme uniqueness, instability and, very often, conflict in place of the tradi-
tional model that Schön (1983) defines as “models of Technical Rationality”; 
that is, the activity of the teacher and of the educator would provide a solution 
by the mere application of theories and techniques with a scientific basis.
Thus, what was “hidden” within the debates around school or academia was 
the fact that a teacher is not one who is appointed to the mere transmission of 
the content of culture but rather is a professional called to act responsibly in 
sometimes uncertain situations, making choices from his/her knowledge and 
his/her experience. As such, teachers not only contribute to the dissemination 
of knowledge but also play a significant role in determining the direction of 
the cultural, political and social environment in which this knowledge will be 
disseminated. The recovery and the explanation of the experiential and cultural 
background of the teacher is, therefore, recognized as a field in which training 
is needed for general, social, and historical pedagogy.
The training of teachers is no longer limited only to mastery of discipline 
content; rather, it tends to promote a capacity for self-reflection, to constant-
ly challenge, to criticize the tacit understandings built around experiences, to 
bring out a practice that requires a full awareness of individuals’ epistemo-
logical abilities and accountability, compared to outcomes evaluated not only 
in terms of time and content acquisition on the part of the students but also in 
terms of their ability to rework criticism and demonstrate openness to change 
on the basis of the interpretation of their experience and continuous feedback in 
the political, social and cultural context in which they are inserted. In summary, 
because they are scientifically managed, monitored and evaluated, educational 
practices require theoretical awareness regarding the purpose of the educational 
process, the achievement of which can inform the choice of the most appropri-
ate instruments.
Today, in the pedagogical reflection of the general social situation with 
which we are faced, a number of models that define different goals are often 
conflicting – for example, we can consider the debate over history textbooks or 
so-called “ethically sensitive” issues or even the different approaches that char-
acterize interpretations of and interventions in bullying, juvenile delinquency, 
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and education law. However, simply because all are legitimate expressions of 
different viewpoints and cultural and political rights, it is necessary for the 
teacher to adopt a position knowing the historical, political and cultural prec-
edents and roots that have contributed to their genesis and their physiognomy, 
before bothering to acquire the most suitable technique to achieve the objec-
tives identified by the models themselves.
One of the tasks of general pedagogy and social education is to train teach-
ers to identify the links between reflection on the different models of interpreta-
tion of the phenomena and emergencies of educational and practical operation-
al implications that flow from them in response to the educational priorities of 
our time with respect to the formation of free identity, i.e., of “knowing how to 
be” at the level of individual and social recognition of the insurmountable bor-
der between their own and other people’s autonomy. Therefore, it is necessary 
for the teacher, as an educator and not only as the holder of the knowledge to be 
transmitted, to be able to independently analyse such models in depth, which, 
among the others, lend themselves to superficial interpretations, dictated by 
common sense, even by those who entrust to teachers not only the responsibili-
ty of the transmission of content, which has never been the only goal of school, 
but also that of the education of future citizens. The goals are to train teachers 
to constantly address their beliefs, convictions and personal reasons and to take 
responsibility in terms of setting goals and strategies identified in training to 
build the conditions for the creation of constant feedback among the individual, 
the professional and the social field. In this sense, the training of teachers is the 
subject of the research and pedagogical practice of social pedagogy.
Studies in the cognitive sciences (Tokuma-Espinosa, 2010; Strollo, 2008; 
Rossi, 2011, Nguyen & Larson, 2015; McImerney, 2010; Frauenferlder, 2004) 
show that this exchange between teachers and society can be greatly amplified 
by a self-consciousness, which generates a growth of subjective knowledge and 
allows one to transcend the local environment and time period via the consid-
eration of circumstances beyond one’s experience, e.g., trying to find, build, 
invent and anticipate new situations (i.e., test situations, critical situations) and 
trying to locate, determine and challenge prejudices and usual assumptions.
In light of the debate of the last thirty years of the last century, the goal of 
general and social pedagogy is therefore to provide trainers with scientifically 
based tools that make it possible for them to review their “spontaneous educa-
tional actions” so that they are active and independent manufacturers of theo-
retical assumptions from which to interpret their educational experience rather 
than provide theoretical and practical prescriptive frameworks. Encouraging 
the development of a personality characterized by affective and intellectual au-
tonomy, the educator can realize himself or herself while contributing, through 
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social and political action, to create objective conditions for the self-realiza-
tion of the other members of the community. The task of pedagogy is there-
fore to prospect and critically assess directions for which the above-mentioned 
self-realization – rather than be other-directed because of the constraints of 
bio-psycho-social boundaries that deform and block development – can be car-
ried out according to choices geared towards a real improvement, if not a rad-
ical transformation of humanity, that is flatly opposed to the current model, 
sentenced with a split inner fragmentation and concomitant social and political 
alienation. A pedagogue, then, is one who speaks in the first person and is able 
to disclose and argue a viewpoint without delegitimizing divergent views but 
who can simultaneously highlight points of contrast in conventional problemat-
ic cores and promote the free choice of optics to which one may adhere.
It thus becomes necessary to take as the central engine of education inten-
tionality associated with the values, which always guides the processes of mod-
elling educational action. With regard to this heuristic objective, the cognitive 
sciences, which traditionally consist of landmark studies that concern the sur-
vey variables underlying learning processes in school and throughout life, seem 
to offer meaningful suggestions today. In an effort to trace the neurobiological 
volunteer behavioural roots, a reductionist view is partly accepted and partly 
rejected, which enables one to recognize at the same time the physical nature 
of the mind-brain system and the inability to predict anything on the basis of 
knowledge of the neurophysiological activity of the mind responsible for inten-
tional actions and human freedom. These activities, in fact, can be considered 
the result of chaotic-intentional processes, where the term chaos does not mean 
the absence of objective reasons but rather the inability to accurately identi-
fy casual-linear meaning with respect to complex phenomena, such as educa-
tion. The notion of deterministic chaos does not indicate that the phenomena to 
which it is applied have qualities of unintelligibility or incomprehensibility but 
rather only that they require special analytic tools. In a chaotic system, there 
are, in fact, phenomena that obey all the deterministic laws, but because of the 
multiplicity of variables that come into play, such phenomena can be under-
stood only globally and, very often, analysed only a posteriori.
The neuronal structure also presents, from the neurophenomenological per-
spective, emergency features: recent surveys conducted in the field of neuro-
science have made it possible to support the transition from a conception of the 
brain as modular, both topologically and functionally, to one that conceives of 
the brain as operating through the simultaneous action of fragments of modules 
communicating with each other thanks to phenomena of “resonance”: the oc-
currence of resonance between cognitive subsets acting simultaneously, even if 
they are related to specific differentiated functions, reveals the cognitive con-
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figuration of the subject in a given time. The result is the inability to trace a 
global process; although conscious behaviour can refer to only local rules gov-
erning the operation of the brain, the emergence, or the specific cognitive con-
figuration, manifests itself as a construction dependent on a relationship among 
the body in its totality, memory and the environment.
In addition, the neurophenomenological reading of intentionality emphasiz-
es the concept of specularity, a peculiar characteristic of the human organism 
that, in the absence of action models based on personal experience, allows for 
the development of models of action based on what we think that another would 
do in the same situation. The ability depends on the activation of specific cir-
cuits of neurons, namely, mirror neurons, which, when subjects interact with 
others, facilitate, at the elementary level, the neural firing associated with the 
observed movements and, at a more complex level, an understand of the inten-
tions and emotions of our heritage from motor patterns.
From these considerations, it can be said that time and life experiences are 
strong influences on the educational theory of the trainer, and these experienc-
es generate a gradual building of preferential neuronal circuits, representing 
the biological foundation of the generation of voluntary behaviour. As training 
models enjoyed as part of formal training programmes, the trainer looks in a 
mirror at the construction of strategies for action.
The result is the emergence of a dual determination, namely, a biological 
and cultural determination, which, precisely because of its double meaning, 
allows for pedagogical interventions aimed at trainers and at the revision of 
educational process modelling. It is precisely the biological key that allows us 
to ensure the possibility of change by promoting the preservation of autonomy, 
since the specification of the connections that form between neurons is not con-
tained in the genes but rather is the result of the interaction with the random 
nature of the environment. The permanence of the connections is, however, en-
sured by the same genes, as long as these genes are voted helpful and therefore 
are the result of a causal process.
If the intent associated with values is the ability to exercise free and respon-
sible choices among a number of possibilities considered useful, it is necessary 
that the mind-brain system is taught to build a plurality of paths of choice. The 
intention, namely, finding expression in the assumption of models of volun-
tary action, cannot be considered something inherent in the human being nor 
something that emerges from simple interaction with the environment; rather, 
it must be regarded as the outcome of relational processes that enable or inhibit 
emancipation from the double imprisonment of “natural imprinting” – related 
to the construction of the neuronal structure based on experience – and “cultur-
al imprinting” – the results of the cultural impositions, which Richard Dawkins 
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(1976) calls memes, or cultural replicators analogous to genes, to which can be 
attributed what Popper defines as our dispositional knowledge transmission, 
which is the result of certain behaviours from one generation to another.
It is clear that training models (memes) looking in a mirror can be traced to 
a single theoretical matrix in a closed cultural environment; however, when one 
is in a cultural context characterized by a plurality of viewpoints and positions, 
the risk is to encourage operations of a syncretistic nature between conflict-
ing positions, with the consequence of disorganized and incoherent interven-
tions. In this context, it seems necessary to recognize the educational training 
of trainers as a vehicle of memic transmission. This recovery does not seem to 
occur except through a rethinking of the design and persuasive function, and 
therefore the training/formality, as well as the heuristic function, of pedagogi-
cal knowledge that, in terms of research, seems to have unanimously adopted 
a statute regulating the awareness of its plurality and lack of uniqueness. With 
respect to the slope of initial and ongoing trainers, it seems to translate that 
number into one-way routes and not propose it in terms of possible alternatives. 
It is necessary, in fact, that the trainer, as a professional able to respond with 
action when faced with questions that appear incompatible or inconsistent, can 
respond by reflecting appreciation that others have considered similar situa-
tions (Strollo, 2008).
This reading of freedom, understood as a property that can be promoted or 
inhibited by the educational process, inspired recent experiments conducted in 
the laboratory of educational epistemology and practices. The paths workshop 
followed a different path than the implementation strategies of self-reflexive 
skills that are most commonly used because it does not begin with a biograph-
ical analysis of the experience; rather, it begins from a preliminary study and 
a systematization of knowledge of the educational process through the adop-
tion of a comparative-synchronic analysis of the training models. This analysis 
precedes the choice and the development of an action model, i.e., explication 
that occurs strategically through the construction of a hypertext.
The comparative approach to training models experienced is considered, 
therefore, when the preliminary activation of self-reflection strategies and hy-
pertext building operates a reconstruction-explication of the cultural path un-
derlying the modelling process implicit in individuals. The course is aimed at 
the acquisition of strategies of self-reflection starting from an independent and 
responsible action that is the outcome of future conscious and critical choices, 
based on the understanding, control and management of as many alternatives 
possible.
In this context, the study in a synchronic-comparative key (and not only his-
torical and comparative) of contemporary models of training one opens to the 
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possibility of a conscious choice not only of a reference model but also of the 
most appropriate operational tools, enabling more careful review of the same 
through the implementation of devices for self-reflection. This methodologi-
cal approach allows future trainers to become active builders of the theoretical 
premises from which they interpret their own learning experience, rather than 
providing an interpretative framework outside of which their ability to make 
critical choices is limited.
The goal of the volume is to promote reflection on the variables involved in 
the educational process, facilitating the acquisition of more critical and inde-
pendent research skills with regard to the specific pedagogical and social emer-
gencies of our time.
The goal is to objectify the phenomenal consciousness for liberation from 
the constraints that guide it through the bi-cognitive allocation allowing indi-
viduals to be themselves and others to be themselves in the present, offering 
the possibility of self-definition. The unity of consciousness is increasingly the 
result of a recursive loop.
In our case, we question the dynamics underlying the learning processes in 
formal and informal contexts and how these processes are part of general skills 
that cover a set of multiple, complex, poly-distributed and allocated functions. 
Learning mobilizes many levels of mental organization that must be strictly 
adopted in the organization patterns of practical models of training to trans-
late knowledge under investigation into background knowledge that includes 
everything that is taken uncritically for granted in the analysis of a problem.
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The enactive approach has been developing over the last twenty years in the 
field of the cognitive sciences and sciences of education (Frauenfelder, 2004; 
Azzone, 2005; Blakemore, 2005; Strollo 2008; Dixon & Senior 2011; Vick & 
Martinez, 2011; Rivoltella, 2012; Beaton, 2013; Margiotta, 2014; Yoo & Loch, 
2016) Therefore, intentionality has become central to research concerning cog-
nitive processes. It rejects explanations of consciousness that omit the possi-
bility of an internal/external dialectic. In fact, the enactive approach considers 
a process a result of a structural coupling (as a pairing association as Husserl 
would say) between the organism in its wholeness (perception, memory, emo-
tion) and the environment.
The notion of the internal, as a logical system, in contrast to the external, as 
a source of information, must be left behind. However, we need to understand 
that if there is not a source of information, then there will not be the possibility 
of optimizing the adaptation. We have an overabundance of possible worlds, 
and there is not only one corresponding to the truth.
There is no need to choose between construction and representation to ad-
dress knowledge as a problem of scientific research within the cognitive scienc-
es. In fact, one can find the mechanisms demonstrating that it is neither con-
struction nor representation but rather a co-definition or a mutual emergence 
(Varela, 1990).
A pedagogical reflection inspired by neuroscience may have different heu-
ristic goals, or it may question both the educative processes and/or teaching/
learning processes.
Interesting results achieved in the cognitive sciences constitute a turning 
point for teaching practices in schools. However, the difficulty of successfully 
applying the suggestions from laboratory studies must be underlined. In fact, 
it seems challenging to directly transfer neuroscience findings to the teaching 
1. Neuroscience and Pedagogy: What kind  
of alliance is possible?
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practice, which would be implemented only with a transdisciplinary approach 
to the study of learning processes in school.
As Fischer K.W., Immordino-Yang M.H. & Waber D.P. (2007, p. 4) argue, 
“there can be no direct transfer of insights from neuroscience and genetics to 
classroom practice, but only transfer mediated through a joining of practice 
with research. To connect mind, biology, and education, research must move 
beyond the ivory tower into real-life settings, and educational practices must be 
available for scientific scrutiny […] For scientists to carry out useful research 
for education and for teachers to optimally educate based on research evidence 
require interweaving the perspectives of research and practice. Biology and 
cognitive science have as much to learn from education as education has to 
learn from them”.
The transdisciplinary approach starts from a conception of science as a 
“multiple unity”. According to this approach, knowledge becomes important 
because of the culture in which it can express itself while following, at the same 
time, the rules of its inner and unitary “propre morphogenèse”, thus rendering 
the disciplines its inseparable subsystems (Le Moigne, 1995).
The aforementioned approach suits the cognitive sciences borne of the ag-
gregation of different disciplines such as artificial intelligence, linguistics, neu-
roscience, psychology and philosophy of the mind. Those subjects share the 
same focus on the study of the mind and cognition; additionally, they are in a 
synergistic relationship concerning this object of investigation.
However, in recent decades, due to a revival of Darwin’s evolutionism, we 
have understood that cognitive processes are much more diversified than we 
used to believe. On the one hand, this awareness has led to the consideration of 
one’s biological roots from a broader perspective. These roots would be in not 
only the brain but also the whole body and in the coevolution between the or-
ganism and the environment, between the body and the ecosystem. On the oth-
er hand, we are aware that is not possible to generalize strict techniques from 
neuroscientific studies.
Studies about cognition do not constitute an independent and united disci-
pline; rather, they are characterized by a plurality of approaches ranging from 
cognitivism and connectionism, which explain the cognitive processes in terms 
of representation, to the enactive approach, which explains the same processes 
in terms of the production of meaning, with the awareness that there is a world 
that is inseparable from the body, language, and social history.
Pedagogical formation cannot exclude the cognitive dynamics behind hu-
man formation. A pedagogical point of view can be identified in a survey on in-
tentionality, which we consider to be a necessary condition for every formative 
process in education (Fisher, Frey, & Hite, 2016).
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In fact, we can define education as a process intentionally oriented towards 
change in individuals and in society. Education is born with man; it naturally 
belongs to the man who takes care of his baby and who has the intention of di-
recting the baby’s behaviour. This intention, which implicitly drives his purpos-
es, is not always conscious.
The link between education and intentionality, or rather between the edu-
cational action and the motivation driving it, might be analysed from different 
points of view: starting from the assumption that every educational action is 
intentional, intentionality can be considered without any observational counter-
part, and it opens up, in pedagogy, to eminently philosophical and theoretical 
approaches.
On the other hand, the neuroscientific approach explains intentionality as 
man’s distinctive feature in relation to other living beings. It is a distinctive 
trait of the human organism, emerging from its encounter with the environment. 
This way of understanding intentionality enables pedagogical researchers to 
carry out empirical studies concerning both the process of change of people in 
formation and the models of action created by the trainers due to their educa-
tional background.
The opposition between these two approaches is linked to the traditional debate 
regarding the biological vs. cultural dominance on human action. Both of these 
dimensions – those concerning the trainer and those concerning the people in for-
mation – have constituted the core of contemporary pedagogy over the last thirty 
years of the twentieth century. Moreover, they have been investigated through re-
flection developed, by contrast, in the philosophical and psycho-cognitive fields.
In the first case, the emphasis placed on the idiographic dimension of educa-
tional processes has sometimes led to difficulties in the translation of the theo-
retical discourse into strictly planned educational practices; in the second case, 
the accentuated curvature on the nomothetic dimension has generated perplex-
ity towards the elaboration of too-rigidly generalizable formative strategies.
The pedagogical production of the last century’s late seventies is a turning 
point from a pedagogy meant as a merely speculative reflection to a discipline 
meant as the synthesis of different contributions deriving from other disciplines 
concerning formative processes: a whole series of knowledge becomes part of 
pedagogy, constituting its irreplaceable cognitive base.
However, the pedagogical knowledge would have to start from various 
sciences, assimilating and orienting them through the analysis of the educa-
tional process, but pedagogy goes into crisis when it is confronted with other 
disciplines. In fact, it becomes deprived of its identity, being split into many 
specialized sectors without having a nucleus of unitary reflection that gives to 
pedagogy a disciplinary physiognomy.
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We are observing a fragmentation of pedagogical knowledge in a plurality 
of sectors whose unity should be sought only on the practical-operational level.
The debate is still open, although it is possible to identify some areas of re-
flection that have significantly contributed to pedagogy’s epistemological iden-
tity. In fact, some pedagogical “foundational” categories have been identified 
through critical, hermeneutical, and phenomenological approaches. Those cat-
egories are intentionality, reciprocity and responsibility, which return specific-
ity and autonomy to the pedagogical debate despite highlighting the extreme 
precariousness and problematic nature connected to its theoretical and praxic 
“double radicality”.
Pedagogy is praxic knowledge, since its epistemological justification lies 
in its openness to the future and in the transformative function. The object of 
pedagogy is not neutral. It is a formative experience in which normative and 
phenomenological values intersect, realizing its “objectivity” within a social, 
cultural and political context that gives it a meaning.
Therefore, no attempt at reconstruction can be exhaustive. It requires a con-
stant interpretative effort. In other words, the trainer always lives (or should 
live) with a sense of precariousness because of the distance separating the level 
of planning, or one’s “having to be”, from the level of the concrete actions, or 
one’s “being in the story”. Starting from this tension, one can redefine the owned 
assumptions and hypothesis system based on the results of empirical analysis.
During the seventies, in the pedagogical field, there were already research-
ers supporting a possible ‘meeting’ between these ‘apparently conflicting’ as-
sumptions. The researchers made a distinction in the pedagogical framework 
of those years. In fact, they were thinking of a fruitful integration between the 
‘biological constants’, which can be found in the process of human formation 
by using empirical and experimental investigations, and a speculative reflection 
on the educational process in which normative and phenomenological values 
intersect, making partial some positions unilaterally oriented.
In this period, bio-pedagogical studies on learning processes were conduct-
ed. Distancing themselves from any explanation of human action in an exclu-
sively genetic-causal or sociocultural manner, they underlined the complemen-
tarity of these two dimensions involved.
This complementarity scientifically guarantees human education when it 
finds its explanation in a biological thesis arguing the extreme plasticity of hu-
mans. In fact, human beings would go through continuous functional renova-
tions defined in relation to physical and environmental interactions. From this 
perspective, learning depends on biological conditions only because of their 
instrumentality, which is considered the biological element that guarantees the 
cultural one, which is essential for the formation.
STROLLO.indd   21 28/05/19   15:21
Copyright © 2018 by FrancoAngeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy.  ISBN 9788891793997 
22
However, this approach to learning studies redeems pedagogy from its re-
duction to didactic support to the spontaneous maturation and optimization of 
the formative process set by nature. This approach highlights the “preventive” 
and “emancipatory” dimensions of the educational project, allowing us to solve 
the problem of its conditions of possibility more than the problem concerning 
methods and/or contents. Thanks to the analysis of the biological “mechanism”, 
one brings out the incidence of the cultural element on species and humans de-
velopment and growth.
Starting from this premise, it has been possible to study pedagogy in depth 
and in synergy with biology, neuroscience, and cybernetics. All of this con-
tributed to a more mature reflection on the dynamics underlying people-in-for-
mation learning processes. However, the question concerning studies of con-
sciousness is still open. This category is central to philosophical reflection and 
is rarely considered as a significant research object in the bio-cognitive scienc-
es. Consequently, in pedagogy, this category is open to philosophical and edu-
cational contributions rather than to bio-pedagogical ones.
Therefore, the proposal of a neurophenomenology of education constitutes 
the result of an investigation that explored the possibility, even through the 
study of intentionality, of an integration between the objectifying approach of 
the cognitive sciences and the subjective experience lived in a phenomenologi-
cal way so that it would create new and fruitful paths of investigation and ped-
agogical action.
The proposal of such integration comes from the observation that a new 
transcendental science indicated by the Husserlian phenomenological ap-
proach turned to a distinct and separate theme from that of the natural sciences, 
using “a new, radically new method, as opposed to the ‘natural’ one” (Husserl, 
1908). Moreover, the spread of the paradigm of complexity, weakening the 
boundaries between human sciences and natural sciences, was introducing a 
non-reductionist approach to the study of man in the contemporary scientif-
ic scene to lead to a recovery and a revision of the anti-naturalist Husserlian 
positions.
The paradigm of complexity has underlined how the rational, linear and 
mechanistic conceptions, which are peculiar to the biological and physical 
sciences, presented considerable interpretative limits. The crisis of the “sim-
ple explanation” had traditionally connoted natural sciences, which took upon 
them the non-scientific residues of the human sciences – uncertainty, disorder, 
contradiction, plurality – attenuating, sometimes until it disappears, the tradi-
tional dichotomy between the natural sciences and the sciences of the spirit, 
between Naturwissenschaften and Geistewissenschaften, and between explana-
tion and comprehension.
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This framework involves philosophical contributions grown in the cognitive 
sciences aimed at investigating the possibility of a new naturalized phenome-
nology, which would integrate the eidetic description of conscious experiences 
with the most recent scientific-experimental explanations. This approach im-
plies that the phenomenological description would become an integral part of 
the biological explanation rather than constitute an antithesis (Dreyfus, 1982).
However, according to the previous debate, the encounter between 
psycho-pedagogical research and phenomenological research, even if edu-
cationally reconsidered, could only be “impossible” or very hard to find. In 
fact, during the seventies, a new existential and phenomenological trend that 
went against the rigidity of the biological structure of pedagogical cognitivism 
emerged. This trend refused to assume theoretical “a priori” because it wanted 
to rescue that dimension from the cultural, affective and relational experienc-
es neglected because of the construction of widely generalized techniques and 
strategies.
On the one hand, we have those who sometimes assume the “exact sciences” 
method in an uncritical way, declining it on the educational side because of its 
responsiveness to technical and applicative goals. These goals are indicated by 
democratic and programmatic choices, which are achievable in a school “of all” 
and “for all”. All this happens because of a criticism of the “hidden” ideologi-
cal structure orienting towards the pedagogical perspective when formulating 
formative functional models to perpetuate social inequality. Therefore, the is-
sue is not about blaming the ideology’s “nature”, which is nonetheless recog-
nized as “constitutive of human nature”; rather, it concerns the improper use of 
the latter related to education.
During the last thirty years, there have been many attempts to “reanimate” a 
pedagogy intended both in a technological-educational way and as a vehicle of 
knowledge to provide man’s education in its multi-faceted totality. Moreover, 
significant aspects from the bio-pedagogical perspective have contributed by 
highlighting the historical and cultural dimensions, identifying some biological 
“constants” and referring, in particular, to Piaget’s genetic parallelism, accord-
ing to which ontogenesis recapitulates phylogeny. These dimensions are pecu-
liar, both on a phylogenetic and ontogenetic level, to human education – and 
even to physiological education.
Therefore, the bio-pedagogical branches of research seem to open new in-
vestigative pathways to the study of intentionality, assuming the latter in an ed-
ucational way as the engine of every formative process – formal, non-formal 
and informal.
The results of these studies, which led to the transition from Kultur, meant 
as a set of values transcending man and that can be recovered through the con-
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templation and interpretation of the past, to culture, meant as a process of ac-
quisition in which experience obtains a strong heuristic value, serve, according 
to some, to underline how formation cannot be reduced only to state, norm or 
theory, but rather that it is also something that “has to be done”.
Consequently, only a theory of formation, practicable as an intentional ac-
tion or praxis, would satisfy the role of one-in-formation and of the intentional-
ity, free will, power of choice and responsibility that lie under formation.
“Life praxis” is as important in man’s formation as one’s critical and herme-
neutic ability. If this “life praxis” or, as Dewey says, this experience, refers to 
problematic situations that men address differently according to their motiva-
tions, needs, past experiences, then it will be possible to build a theory of for-
mation that will practically start different and diversified interventions based on 
and respecting these individual differences.
We should pursue a synthesis of the theoretical dimension, which under-
lines the relational element existing between the individual’s environment and 
the lived experience, and the praxic dimension, which focuses on the organi-
zation of the educational offer, which concerns one’s needs. According to this 
approach, a pedagogical reflection around the concept of formation should be 
developed.
Therefore, starting from this interpretation of the pedagogical discipline, 
it seemed inevitable “to test” what was theorized from the study about inten-
tionality in a phenomenological and neo-phenomenological way, constructing 
pathways that methodologically resumed the theoretical suggestions, translat-
ing them into trainers’ “experiences” of formation and self-formation.
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An immediate connection between the educational and neuroscientific perspec-
tives can be supported by didactic goals, which are strictly connected to the 
management of education dynamics. It does not seem practicable according to 
the pedagogical perspective when we are in front of an object of research whose 
relevant aspects are manifold, complex and changeable because they are his-
torically and culturally determined. The thought about the educational action, 
as intentionally oriented, needs to be demarcated and fenced to focus on what 
constitutes its essential, basic components.
Furthermore, we need philosophy mostly for the analysis of the basis of ed-
ucation. We cannot conduct science if we do not circumscribe the research ob-
ject. However, Metelli di Lallo (1966) reminds us that a bio-pedagogical path 
should lead us to “discriminate between the delineation of features common to 
all men beyond the historical-environmental differences”, but it becomes nec-
essary to refer to philosophy and to the philosophy of education in order to de-
fine which features one has to investigate because they are significant for the 
purposes of the pedagogical discourse, which, it should be remembered, is his-
torically, culturally, socially and politically determined.
The research path addressing the drift of the bio-cognitive sciences is im-
pervious according to the study of intentionality in general and of intentional-
ity seen from an educational perspective, since the sciences addressing the na-
ture of consciousness and intentionality find themselves lacking a univocal and 
always-convincing answer.
Studying consciousness constitutes a primarily methodological “hard prob-
lem”. Inside of it, the observed cognitive events are associated and intertwined 
with the experiential elements of the observer, and often, the study of this twine 
is left behind, reducing conscious experience to mere observed data: “The most 
difficult problem (the hard problem) of consciousness is the experience. When 
we think or perceive, there’s an enormous information processing activity, but 
2. Intentionality between phenomenology and the 
cognitive sciences
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there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel says, one feels something in being a 
conscious organism. This subjective aspect is the experience” (Chalmers, 1995, 
p. 202).
Addressing the problem of consciousness, a rich scientific production has 
formulated hypotheses explaining it as a specific property of the neural net-
works working in connection with each other. In fact, according to Francis 
Crick and his ‘Astonishing Hypothesis’, the oscillations that take place in the 
cerebral cortex in a certain frequency band would activate mental abilities such 
as self-awareness (Crick, 1995).
Nevertheless, according to Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (1996), the 
microtubules, microphysical structures inserted in the cellular structure, would 
produce fundamental quantum effects in the functioning of consciousness, con-
stituting a sort of self-organized network inside of each element in connection 
within the macro-nervous network.
These studies refer to consciousness in terms of “awareness”, “attention”, 
and a “mental image of reality” (representation), i.e., an entity that is explic-
it and shareable, rather than in terms of “intention” and “deep motivation”, 
which are not similarly communicable (Gallagher, 1996). The previously men-
tioned meaning of intentionality and consciousness is often believed, according 
to the cognitive sciences, to be lacking an observable counterpart and is there-
fore susceptible to a theoretical/speculative study rather than to an empirical/
experimental study.
However, philosophy and specifically phenomenology show new research 
perspectives in the cognitive sciences: concerning the investigation of inten-
tionality, phenomenology is seen from the perspective of the paradigm of com-
plexity and free from the suspicious attitudes towards the natural sciences that 
currently, thanks to this paradigm, seem to have undergone a revolutionary 
transformation, which is, precisely, that of reflecting on cognitive processes!
Giovanni Piana (1966) argues that it would be totally incorrect to coun-
terpose the reflective person to the perceiving one, presenting the first one as 
abstract and the second one as concrete. We need to refuse a naive opposition 
between abstract and concrete, understanding, instead, the different levels of 
our thematic abstractions and precisely defining their meaning. Finally, this 
consideration is valid not only for properly phenomenological research but also 
generally for every study, which must necessarily isolate an object, separating 
it from the concrete context in which it is inserted, concentrating on what it is 
in itself, and then eventually bringing it back within that context, thus having 
clarified its internal relations.
Phenomenological intentionality is ab imis the principle and the outcome of 
a “human” action that takes place in a time and space and whose first moment 
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is the perception: every conscious experience is, to a certain degree, perceptive 
consciousness; it is inhering things through the body (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 
p. 194).
We do not already have a constituent consciousness of things, as idealism 
proposes, or a preordaining of things to consciousness, as realism proposes (giv-
en that what interests us is that they are indiscernible, as they both affirm the 
adequacy of the thing and of the spirit); rather, with our body, our senses, our 
gaze, and our power to understand and speak words, we have measurers of the 
Being, of the dimensions in which we can bring it back, and not a relationship of 
adequacy or immanence. The perception of the world and of history is the prac-
tice of this measure, the identification of their gap or our difference towards our 
norms. If we ourselves are in question in the development of our lives, “it is be-
cause we are” a perpetual enterprise of detecting ourselves in the constellations 
of the world and of things in our dimensions (Merleau-Ponty, 1964).
In any case, although phenomenology presents a sophisticated analysis of 
perception in all its forms – one might think about all of Merleau-Ponty’s work – 
it limits itself, grasping the intentional correlation of perceptive acts without say-
ing anything about the actual structure of the acts themselves. In an open and re-
ciprocal exchange relationship, phenomenology can therefore offer to the cogni-
tive sciences a “process of exploration of the experience”, in which the cognitive 
sciences would confirm or revise certain intuitions related to the “phenomenal” 
consciousness, in particular to its being – according to the definitions that, even 
with different nuances, were given by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty: constitutive 
(constructive), anonymous (implicit) and intersubjective.
2.1. Intentionality’s constitutive nature
Husserl uses the term ‘constituting’ (konstituieren) analogously to its jurid-
ical meaning: saying, for example, that “I make a debtor in default” does not 
mean that I actually make someone become a debtor while he is not; rather, it 
indicates that I am giving, through my actions, a juridically formal qualification 
to the debtor’s fact, transforming an insolvency de facto into a declared insol-
vency, which is legally relevant. Doing so, I certainly will not give birth to the 
insolvency, and yet in a certain sense, in the sense of the juridical relevance, I 
put it into being: in short, I bring it into being in a new way.
In this sense, the constitutive nature of the intentional experience is taken up 
by Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception when the author states 
the following: perception is precisely that act which in a single part creates, 
with the constellation of data, the sense that links them - that act that does not 
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limit itself to discover the meaning that the data have, but makes sure that they 
make sense; the perceived object and the perceiving subject owe their thickness 
to feeling. It is the intentional plot that the effort of knowledge will try to break 
down (Merleau-Ponty, 1945).
One of the most important aspects for the pedagogical reflection on inten-
tionality, which takes place in the Husserlian work and was confirmed by recent 
neurological studies on mirror neurons, is that one related to the interpretation 
of the body in terms of the sensory-motor apparatus as a generator of the vol-
untary act. Husserl faces this problem in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the second 
volume of Ideas pertaining to Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological 
Philosophy (1859), in which the living body is defined in terms of the organ of 
the will of free movements: Leib (which has a layer of localized sensations) is 
the organ of will and is the only object that the will of my transcendental ego 
can freely and spontaneously move and that is a mean to produce a spontane-
ous and mediated movement of other things. For example, my hand, if spon-
taneously and immediately moved, can push, grab, raise, etc. Merely material 
things can only be mechanically moved; they are spontaneously movable only 
in a mediated line, and only the lived bodies can be spontaneously and imme-
diately (“freely”) moved. This phenomenon occurs because of the free ego and 
its will, which inheres to the Leib. These free acts are those for which a world 
of objects is constituted, a world of bodily spatial things (and, in this world, also 
the Leib-thing). A person, which constitutes a correspondent of the material na-
ture, is (as far as we have seen) an ego to which a living body inheres as a field 
of localization of its sensations; this ego has the “faculty” (I can) to freely move 
this Leib, or the organs in which it is articulated, and through them, to perceive 
an external world.
Husserl gives importance to the construction of the action, defined by neu-
rosciences studies about coevolution as a hedonistic modality, based on the 
pleasure/unpleasure principle: the localization given by an immediate insight 
and the link to Leib that finds itself in this insight, do not belong only to the 
sensory sensations that are constitutive of the sensorial things, of the objects 
showing up in the space. Rather, they also relate to sensations given by com-
pletely different groups, for instance, “sensitive” feelings, feelings of pleasure 
and pain, the sense of well-being that runs through and fills the whole body, the 
general discomfort deriving from a “bodily indisposition”.
Here, therefore, groups of sensations for evaluative acts come together, as 
for intentional experiences of sentiment’s sphere, or for the constitution of val-
ues as intentional correlates. They all play a role of materials that is analogous 
to that played by primary sensations for intentional experiences in the sphere of 
the experience, or to constitute the space and thingness of the objects.
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Moreover, several sensations become part of this field. Those are difficult 
to analyse and illustrate, creating part of the desire’s life and will, energy sen-
sations of tension and relaxation, sensations of internal inhibition, paralysis, 
liberation, etc. All these groups of sensations, as they are localized, have an 
immediate somatic localization, so that they belong in an immediately intuitive 
way to every man’s Leib as one’s own Leib, as a subjective objectivity that is 
distinguished from Körper, a merely material thing, through this layer of local-
ized sensations.
From a philosophical perspective, neurophenomenological approach roots 
have to be found in the Husserlian and Merleaupontian phenomenology as well 
as in Heidegger’s and Gadamere’s early works: the term hermeneutics is under-
stood as “enaction” or “production” of the meaning sprung from a knowledge’s 
background, depending on the existence in a world inseparable from the body, 
language, and social history.
Human action is meant as the fulcrum of an incessant process of 
signification, which concerns not only cognition but also the historical and 
individual-emotional dimension, a process whose explicit nature goes along 
with action’s implicit levels. The signification process uses – according to 
Merleau-Ponty’s definition taken up by the cognitive sciences (Varela, 1992a) – 
“embodied patterns” that are not personal or peculiar to the individual who ex-
periences them and uses them; rather, they result as culturally shared experien-
tial modalities.
Enactive theory’s core is the concept of an action that is perceptually guided. 
According to representationalism, the starting point to understanding percep-
tion corresponds to the problem, which is related to the elaboration of informa-
tion and of the reconstructing world’s pre-established properties. The starting 
point of the enactive approach concerns, instead, a perceiver’s way of guiding 
his actions in his own particular situation. Because of the constant changes of 
specific situations due to the effect of the perceiver’s activity, the reference 
point for understanding perception is no longer a pre-established world that is 
independent of the perceiver but rather the sensorimotor structure of the per-
ceiver (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991)
Enaction indicates that every human action (and every human action is in-
tentional experience) is exclusively produced through sensory-motor manipu-
lative acts. According to the enactive approach, perception is not only bounded 
by the surrounding environment, but it also contributes to the environment’s 
effective activation, so that the organism, at the same time, starts off and is 
formed by the environment. (Varela, 1992b)
On the methodological level, it is possible to trace the adoption of a pro-
cedure very close to that proposed by the phenomenological tradition, since 
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the correlation between the subjective act and the data to which this act is ad-
dressed precedes and explains the separation between the thing and the ways in 
which the thing manifests itself. The subjective acts of perception explain the 
appearance of the independent reality of the thing and vice versa.
The study of perception does not include the consideration of a pre-exist-
ing world that is independent of one’s perception. Instead, scholars consider 
the cognitive agent’s sensory-motor structure, or the way in which the nervous 
system connects the sensory and motor surfaces (ibidem). The outside, or the 
environment, has a disturbing function that initiates the activation of percep-
tion, but when it operates in local situations, those functions constantly change 
because the subject of perception, namely, the sensory-motor structure, deter-
mines how this subject can act and how it can be modulated by environmental 
events.
The experience is not lived as physical-computational but rather as embod-
ied-dynamics. Using the word embodied, Varela intends to highlight two ideas. 
First, cognition depends on the type of experience deriving from the possession 
of a body with different sensorimotor capacities, and second, such individual 
sensorimotor capacities are themselves included in a broader biological, psy-
chological and cultural context. Using the word action, we want to underline, 
once again, that in lived cognition, the sensory and motor processes, perception 
and action, are fundamentally inseparable. These two aspects in the individual 
are not only contingently linked but are also simultaneously evolved (Varela, 
1992b).
The enactive model’s peculiarity does not depend, therefore, on the origin 
of the representations; rather, it concerns their development and their progres-
sive transformation into knowledge, which is meant in terms of the “collateral 
effect” of experience.
According to the visual perception, what the subject sees “depends on how 
one is made rather than on how the world is made”; “perception is not sim-
ply involved and bounded by the surrounding world but it also contributes to 
world’s enaction/production”, so that the organism generates the environment 
and at the same time is shaped by the latter, i.e., “the events taking place at the 
retina’s level only have the effect of modulating the activity of neuronal aggre-
gates to which the retina is connected”.
Therefore, it is simpler and more natural to say that the system acquires an 
internal coherence through its interconnections among different regions; this 
coherence is modulated by a coupling interface with the outside, such as the 
retina. The key of such a structured system is therefore the synthesis and diver-
sity of its self-behaviours rather than the nature of the perturbations modulating 
them. For example, it is possible to show that, apart from exceptional cases, the 
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perception of a colour is virtually independent of light’s physical features hit-
ting the eye. The internal mechanism that defines the colour is a comparative 
operation between two levels of neuronal activity (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 
1991).
On the one hand, the fundamental role played in the cognitive processes 
by the individual “constructions” connected to the perceptual experience is the 
overcoming of the deterministic vision of the innatism (Varela, 1999, p. 270), 
after which the re-evaluation of the time’s role and experience become evident. 
Learning from the other, namely, the disturbing role of the environment, which, 
precisely because it poses a kind of confused problem – to resume the use of the 
Merleaupontyan terminology – activates the same constructive processes.
Perceptual action, or rather the perceptual experience, must be understood 
as the outcome of the relationship between the inside and the outside instead 
of merely internal or external to the body. Internal is not related to the neural 
structure but rather to the organism in its totality.
2.2. Intentionality’s implicit nature
Phenomenological intentionality must be meant in procedural and planning 
terms. “It is not a static consciousness-of, but it continuously and dynamically 
overcomes its own dynamic; it is not just being, it works; in every experience, 
intentionality works as an implicit project and, at the same time, as a retrospec-
tive look” (Brand, 1955). Intentionality is anonymous or, rather, implicit. In 
its constituting the objects of experience, in fact, intentionality does not pick 
them from nothing but rather explicates what first was implicit. In other words, 
“having consciousness” is not the same as “being aware”; the fact that an act is 
aware is a new quality that it can possess or not (Piana, 1966).
Therefore, Giovanni Piana claims that when we say that every subjec-
tive act has an intentional structure, we also want to understand the acts that 
I “inadvertently” perform “without realizing it”, and so on (ivi, p. 93). The 
implicit nature of consciousness is also supported by Merleau-Ponty when he 
states that when perceiving, we will not think of the object and we do not think 
about ourselves while thinking of said object; rather, we inhere to the object and 
we get confused with this body that knows more than us about the world and 
the reasons and the means that we have to make the synthesis (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945).
It is an aspect circularly connected to the constitutive nature of the percep-
tive consciousness: in what we call, in every moment, our reason or our ideas, 
we would always find, if we were developing all the presuppositions, experi-
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ences that have not been explicated, masses of the past and of the present, a 
whole sedimented history that does not only concern the genesis of my thought 
but also determines its meaning.
Regarding the internal dynamics, the emergency principle introduces the 
possibility of considering each action as characterized by the co-participation 
between different brain regions (Varela, 1992b, p. 77), functionally distinct 
and topographically distributed, and their sensory-motor incarnation (Varela, 
1999, p. 271).
Recent investigations, carried out in the neuroscientific field, have allowed 
us to support the change from a modular conception of the brain, both from 
the topological and functional point of view, to one that envisions it as operat-
ing through the simultaneous action of module fragments communicating with 
each other because of “resonance” phenomena: the occurrence of a resonance 
between cognitive subsets that act simultaneously, even if assigned to specific 
differentiated functions, brings out the cognitive configuration of the subject at 
that precise moment (Varela, 1995, p. 42).
These actions result in the impossibility of tracing a global process, such as 
conscious behaviour, exclusively to the local rules governing cerebral function-
ing: the emergence, or the specific cognitive configuration, manifests itself as 
a construction depending on a relationship between the organism’s totality and 
the environment.
Consequently, the traditional notion of a cognitive agent, which collects in-
formation and decides on subsequent actions, is replaced by the concept of 
transitory configuration emerging in a moment and disappearing in the follow-
ing moment, with this pattern continuing for every fraction of a second (ivi, 
pp. 43-45).
Talking about an emerging action is the same as saying that it is a continu-
ally changing structure, or the provisional result of a codetermination of neural 
elements and a global cognitive subject, and precisely because it is the product 
of a global process, it does not allow itself to be analytically decomposed in 
separate elements (memory, emotion, reason): “Ordinary life is necessarily one 
of situated agents, continually coming up with what to do faced with ongoing 
parallel activities in their various perceptuo-motor systems. This continual re-
definition of what to do is not at all like a plan, stored in a repertoire of poten-
tial alternatives, but enormously dependent on contingency improvisation, and 
more flexible than planning. Situatedness means that a cognitive entity has – by 
definition – a perspective. This means that it is not related to its environment 
“objectively”, which is independent of the system’s location, heading, attitudes 
and history. Instead, it relates to it in relation to the perspective established 
by the constantly emerging properties of the agent itself and in terms of the 
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role such running redefinition plays in the system’s entire coherence” (Varela, 
1992c, p. 11).
From this, it follows that reason cannot be considered the central engine of 
cognition, while every prereflective, affective, non-conceptual, prenoetic as-
pect of human experience takes on importance. All cognitive phenomena are, 
therefore, also emotional-affective phenomena.
2.3. Intentionality’s intersubjective nature
Entropathy (Einfühlung) is the core of the Husserlian phenomenology; it re-
calls the ability “transfer” to an organic body (which is foreign but which one 
recognizes as analogous to one’s own body) the “localization” of one’s own 
psychic acts. However, this attribution constitutes only the first step in an un-
derstanding of the other and of ourselves.
In introducing a psychicity into another person, I will be able to recognize 
it in myself: I am transferring in the objective living body, standing in front of 
me, the localization already internally accomplished in my body. Then, I will 
transfer the result of this first transfer onto me; thus, I am transferring the whole 
man-unity onto me.
At the same time, the ego distinguishes itself from another, recognizing the 
latter’s unfamiliarity. In that, the ego experiences its being directed towards ob-
jects different from its intended ones: since the other body there enters into a 
pairing association with my body here and, being given perceptually, becomes 
the core of an appresentation, the core of my experience of a coexisting ego, 
that ego, according to the whole sense-giving course of the association, must be 
appresented as an ego now coexisting in the mode There, “such as I should be if 
I were there”. My own ego, however, the ego given in constant self-perception, 
is actual now with the content belonging to his Here. Therefore, an ego is ap-
presented, as other than mine (Husserl, 1859).
Pedagogical studies inspired by phenomenology have focused on this top-
ic, claiming that the aim of the educational relationship wishes that the student 
were able to gradually implement an Einfühlung movement towards the educa-
tor, and more generally, in relation to the others: knowing that such perspective 
will only be possible if the educator will have spoken the educator’s language, 
starting from his own experience.
The second section of this volume will show how the enrichment of the 
Einfühlung with the notion of specularity relates to the need for a recovery of 
the formal dimension of formators pedagogical formation as well as the infor-
mal dimension.
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The intersubjective dimension, in any case, is closely connected to the anon-
ymous dimension emerging from the analysis carried out by Merleau-Ponty, 
which regards the emotional expressions:
“The fact is that the behaviour associated with anger or love is not the same 
in Japanese and Occidental culture. Or, to be more precise, the difference in be-
haviour corresponds to a difference in the emotions themselves. It is not only 
the gesture that is contingent on the body’s organization, but it is also the man-
ner itself in which we meet the situation and live it. The angry Japanese person 
smiles; the Westerner goes red and stamps his foot or else goes pale and hisses 
his words. It is not enough for two conscious subjects to have the same organs 
and nervous system for the same emotions to produce in both the same signs. 
What is important is how they use their bodies, the simultaneous patterning of 
body and world in emotion” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945).
The use that man makes of his body is not, therefore, directly related to his 
biological system: everything is both manufactured and natural in man, as it 
were, in the sense that there is not a word, not a form of behaviour that does not 
owe something to purely biological being – and which at the same time does 
not elude the simplicity of animal life, and cause forms of vital behaviour to 
deviate from their pre-ordained direction through a sort of leakage and through 
a genius for ambiguity that might serve to define man (ibidem).
It has been said that opening to the intentionality’s inquiry in the scientif-
ic field is indicated by the same philosophy. A first methodological indication 
comes from Merleau-Ponty, who states that our body is in the world like the 
heart is in the organism: it continuously keeps the visible spectacle alive; it an-
imates it, internally nourishing it and creating a system with it. The phenom-
enological reflection, despite correlating consciousness to the peculiar senso-
ry-motor structure of the human organism, does not identify it in it. This phe-
nomenological reflection can be considered a consciousness emerging from the 
relationship among three distinct and related phenomena: the body, the world, 
the others.
Consciousness results from the relationship among these phenomena. It 
does not require purely materialistic explanations but rather methodological 
procedures taking into account its procedural nature connected to its emer-
gence from the experience of the world in a determined time and space. 
Merleau-Ponty still offers us suggestions in this sense: as far as I have a body 
through which I act in the world, space and time are not, for me, a collection of 
adjacent points, nor are they a limitless number of relations synthesized by my 
consciousness, and into which it draws my body. I am not in space and time, 
nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with 
them and includes them.
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The organism and the environment, “sensitive and sensible”, need to stand 
in front of each other. If the sensation is not an eruption of the sensible in the 
sentient” but rather is the result of a coupling, of a synchronization between the 
internal and external, an analysis that takes into account only one of the poles 
of the relationship would only be partial or misleading. In fact, the external en-
vironment pays my body a confused problem. It is necessary for me to find the 
attitude that will enable my body to determine itself. In addition, I’m only doing 
it after its solicitation.
Thus, from the phenomenological analysis of the corporeity derives a fun-
damental methodological indication not only for the cognitive sciences but also 
for the pedagogy: it is impossible to study the intentionality disregarding the 
relationship between two poles, namely, the individual and the environment. 
Once phenomenology has come to support the inseparability of consciousness 
from human action, it becomes impossible to grasp subjectivity in its fullness 
exclusively through speculative analyses. It will be necessary to widen the re-
search to that actuality in which the subject objectifies itself, to those real con-
tents of movement portraying man’s worldliness and of which the so-called an-
thropological sciences, i.e., biology and anthropology, are addressed.
Therefore, empirical and transcendental analysis cannot be considered an 
opposing but rather a single analysis “aimed at understanding the wholeness of 
the absolute phenomenon, of the concrete experience of the authentically ‘hu-
man’”. Consequently, the empirical study of intentionality requires a particular 
methodological procedure: the intimate connection of human action with spa-
tiality and temporality does not allow for an analysis assuming “theoretical a 
priori”, while it requires a temporary “suspension of judgement”. It requires, as 
well, the exercise of a systematic capacity to reflect in real time upon the phe-
nomenon “as it appears”, which does not exclude the possibility of identifying 
“constants” that are common to a plurality of phenomena.
STROLLO.indd   35 28/05/19   15:21
Copyright © 2018 by FrancoAngeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy.  ISBN 9788891793997 
36
In the field of the evolutionist epistemology, formation is defined as the willing-
ness to change, allowing a living organism to maintain its autonomy in different 
and dynamic environments.
It therefore presupposes a cognitive ability that immediately reacts to a great 
variety of situations. According to the enactive approach, defining the “human 
formation” in evolutionary terms recalls a concept of human action that, far 
from being susceptible to an objective and a mechanistic reduction, underlines 
how the subjective processes are closely connected to the historical and social 
environments in which they occur.
Form emerges in “successive interactions”. Far from being imposed on mat-
ter by some agent, it is a function of the reactivity of matter at many hierarchi-
cal levels and of the responsiveness of those interactions to each other. Because 
mutual selectivity, reactivity, and constraint take place only in actual processes, 
it is these that […] make genetic and environmental influences interdependent 
as genes and gene products are environment to each other as the extraorganis-
mic environment is made internal by psychological and biochemical assimila-
tion, as the internal state is externalized through products and behaviour that 
select and organize the surrounding world (Oyama, 1985, p. 22).
The coevolutionary perspective starts from the consideration that in a sim-
plified ecosystem, the adaptation is not imposed from the outside; rather, it 
emerges from a “dance” in which everyone constantly tries to adapt to every-
one else. In this regard, M. Waldrop (1993) refers to the metaphor of the fly 
(prey) and of the frog (predator): to achieve coevolution between the frog and 
the fly, it is necessary for both of them to adapt their development and their be-
havioural strategies to those of the other one, which does not mean eliminat-
ing the conflict inherent in the relationship between prey/predator but instead 
maintaining a situation of dynamic equilibrium in which both of the evolutions 
become possible.
3. Neurophenomenology and didactics of Pedagogy
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Therefore, in a stable ecosystem in which all the agents have adapted to 
each other, there is little evolutionary pressure to change. However, if one of 
the agents undergoes a change large enough to let it out of its equilibrium con-
ditions, then it will cause a change in one of its neighbours, causing an av-
alanche of changes until each part stops changing and a new equilibrium is 
reached. […] This explains why it does not correspond to the complexity of the 
real world the fact that the frog always tries to catch the fly with its long sticky 
tongue and the fox always chases the rabbit and so on. It happens, however, 
that if the frog evolves with a longer tongue, the fly must learn to escape more 
quickly, and if the fly develops a chemical substance to make it more unpleas-
ant to taste, the frog must learn to tolerate it (Waldrop, 1993, p. 500).
Starting from the results of these studies (Holland, 1975; Brooks & Wiley, 
1986; Buss, 1987; Bourgine, 1996; Waldrop, 1993; Kauffman, 1993), three 
types of human action have been identified: a reactive modality, a hedonistic 
modality and an eductive modality, reflecting the cognitive levels that underlie 
the evolution of the human species.
The differences among the three constructive schemes depends on different 
cognitive factors that intervene when building the action. The reactive action 
does not require the use of particular cognitive strategies and allows for the adap-
tation to complex environments exclusively for very simple tasks. More sophis-
ticated actions, carried in an evolutionary environment, require the elaboration 
of the action based on one’s own experience, referring to a principle of pleasure/
displeasure. This is the hedonistic level: because of self-reinforcing processes, 
the agent operates some anticipations to be capable of using new strategies. At a 
hedonistic level, these strategies are stiff and slowly evolving. The only way for 
an agent to modify inappropriate strategies in real time is eduction, which is the 
ability to mentally simulate future actions, regardless of one’s direct experience 
or imitation, and starting from models of one’s cognitive and symbolic function-
al dynamics to the strategies to be implemented. Therefore, education designates 
the agent’s ability to simulate numerous cognitive trajectories when necessary 
and to self-learn from these virtual trajectories (Bourgine, 1996).
We should emphasize how intentionality is not considered, such as the rea-
son for human evolution, but as a result: “Human perception of meaning and 
function in nature is an evolutionary product that has accompanied the emer-
gence of intentionality from the physics of our brains. Human behaviour is 
largely determined by the capacity of ours to set up intentional goals and to 
make tools and other artefacts adapted to these goals. In any case, intentionality 
and conscious design, the result of the human and a few other animal species’ 
evolution, are cognitive capacities exhibited by those species, but do not neces-
sarily characterize the process of evolution itself” (Atlan, 1994, p. 143).
STROLLO.indd   37 28/05/19   15:21
Copyright © 2018 by FrancoAngeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy.  ISBN 9788891793997 
38
The limit for an isolated agent consists of the possibility of using models 
of action only built on the basis of one’s experience: there is one way to build 
models, which are not just based on the individual experience, and it lies in the 
possibility of using models, which raise from the experience of other agents. It 
assumes a new ability, the specularity: one was thinking, modelling and reason-
ing, in a given situation, as the others would think, model, reason in the same 
situation. This is one of the main aspects of the notion of specularity, which is 
useful to analyse the cohesion of human societies. When addressing a new situ-
ation, the human being builds up models as a function of what one observes but 
also, and above all, as a function of what one thinks that the other people would 
modelize if they were in one’s shoes.
One of the most important elements of enactive formation is the intersub-
jectivity, the complementarity of different selves involved in the formation pro-
cesses. In fact, one of the distinctive elements of superior primates would be to 
excel in providing an interpretation of another person’s mind. This ability rep-
resents a particular kind of intelligence connected to the understanding of men-
tal states, such as desires, intentions and beliefs, based on the bodily presence 
of the other, or to one’s face, posture and sound (Varela, 2000, p. 12).
Therefore, the other person is assimilated, not as an object but as another 
similar subjectivity, an alter-ego, sharing the same organic structure embod-
ied in the same vital field: “this dual dimension of the body, which is organic 
and lived, is the basis of formation and ‘human evolution’, meant in terms of 
co-evolution”.
At this point, integrating Piaget’s genetic parallelism with the studies on 
coevolution supports the coexistence of three modes of constructing the action 
– reactive, hedonistic and eductive – which, individuated at the phylogenet-
ic level, would also constitute the basis of the processes of change on the on-
togenetic level: when developing, the reflexive modes of action, peculiar to a 
more mature age, would not take the place of the reactive modalities, implying 
a lack of reflexivity that is peculiar to the first years of life, but rather would 
cohabit with them.
For example, Mounoud’s theory starts from Piaget’s stage theory, revising 
its basic structure especially with regard to the conception of the sensory-motor 
stage, in which consciousness and intentionality are considered transients’ 
phenomena that are necessary for all developmental and learning processes 
rather than constitutive phenomena of psychic mental structures (Mounoud, 
1990, p. 206). It follows that not all actions need a reflexive consciousness, 
but there are direct and immediate behaviours, which does not mean that the 
behaviour is defined by the structure of information but rather that there would 
be an optimal adjustment between the organization or the structure of the col-
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lected stimuli and the organization of the action procedures of the subject 
(ibidem).
We can therefore consider the process of formation in terms of an alterna-
tion between the adaptation phases, which are characterized by reactive and 
implicit behaviours, and the reorganization phases, which are characterized by 
“transitory awareness traits giving to the behaviours an active, intentional and 
explicit nature”. Therefore, “we are faced with the following paradox: adapt-
ed behaviours do not make intentionality intervene, as an active production of 
connections or involvement relations”; it only implicitly happens. “In contrast, 
the behaviours manifesting a maladjustment are those that simultaneously man-
ifest one’s ‘intelligent’ abilities and the phenomena of consciousness” (ibidem).
Starting from these premises, in part, we both have to accept and reject the 
reductionist idea of intentionality, recognizing, at the same time, the physical 
nature of the mind-brain system and the impossibility of predicting the activi-
ties of the neurophysiological processes on the basis of the knowledge of neu-
rophysiological processes that are responsible for voluntary behaviour and hu-
man freedom.
Mind is here understood according to the definition given by A.R. Damasio 
in his Feeling of What Happens (1999), including conscious and unconscious 
operations. It is a process, not to a thing. What we know as a mind, with the 
help of consciousness, is a continuous stream of mental configurations, many of 
which are logically linked. The flow moves forward in time, quickly or slowly, 
in a regular manner or jumping, and from time to time, it advances along sev-
eral currents. Sometimes the currents proceed in parallel, sometimes they con-
verge and sometimes they diverge, and sometimes they overlap (p. 407 sgg.).
Therefore, mental activities can be considered the result of chaotic-intentional 
processes, where chaos does not represent the absence of objective causes but 
rather the inability to accurately identify said causes in the casual-linear sense, 
which are complex phenomena such as education. The notion of deterministic 
chaos does not indicate that the phenomena to which it is applied have char-
acteristics of unintelligibility or incomprehensibility but only that they require 
particular instruments of analysis, and therefore, it does not weaken at all the 
determinist conception of the world; rather, it constitutes a support. Introducing 
chaos overcomes the conflict between the strictly deterministic-mechanistic vi-
sion of the world and the existence of human freedom, which would apparently 
be incompatible with deterministic laws.
It is a model applied to those systems with three main characteristics:
a) they are subject to the simultaneous action of many factors;
b) microscopic variations can be accompanied by macroscopic effects;
c) the initial conditions of the system are not exactly known.
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The result of the coexistence of these factors lies under those imperceptible 
causes that have macroscopic effects. Therefore, in a chaotic system, there are 
phenomena that obey deterministic laws, but due to the multiplicity of variables, 
such phenomena can be only globally understood and analysed a posteriori.
Regarding the mind-brain system, the chaotic-intentional perspective origi-
nates from the assumption that voluntary behaviour results from the activation 
of preferential neuronal circuits, gradually constructed from the experience, but 
it cannot be reduced to those circuits since it reflects the possibility to choose 
some circuits among the others (varying the system’s information content) and 
a tendency to a subsequent stabilization of the choice. The interaction with the 
environment and the evaluation is followed by the choice (or selection) of the 
structures that are more efficient or more suitable and then their stabilization 
and their reinforcement, that is, the production of other similar structures, but 
even more efficient and in greater numbers.
Thus, the system increases the number of structures with a greater func-
tional efficiency, as well as the overall efficiency of the system and its infor-
mation content. Concerning the mind-brain system, variability and instability 
are related to the fluidity of synaptic connections within neuronal networks, 
and fluidity causes a continuous interruption and reformation of the connec-
tions. The mind-brain system can be seen as an extremely fluid network made 
of trillions of synaptic connections, subject to a continuous reorganization and 
self-organization, as a result of the lived experiences, in parallel both with the 
performance of the functional tasks and independently from said development 
(Azzone, 2005, p. 127).
The neurophenomenological reading of intentionality highlights the con-
cept of specularity, a peculiar characteristic of the human organism, which in 
absentia of action models based on the personal experience, allows for the de-
velopment of action models based on what we think that another person would 
do in the same situation.
This ability is reflected in the activation of specific neuron circuits, namely, 
the mirror neurons, which allow, when the subjects interact with each other on 
an elementary level, the correlation between the observed movements to one’s 
own movements and to recognize the meaning, on a more complex level, to 
understand the intentions and emotions of the other person starting from our 
motor skills.
The observer’s act is a potentiality caused by the activation of mirror neu-
rons, which encode the sensory information in motor terms and make it possi-
ble that ‘reciprocity’ of acts and intentions that constitute our immediate recog-
nition of the other gestures’ meaning. Understanding people’s intentions’ here 
has nothing of the ‘theoretical’, but it lays on the automatic selection of those 
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strategies of action that, according to our motor skills, become always more 
compatible with the observed scenario (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006, p. 127).
Starting from these reflections, we can affirm that they certainly affect train-
er’s implicit pedagogical theory. It is not only about life experiences, which 
generate a gradual construction of preferential neuronal circuits that represent 
the biological foundation generating voluntary behaviours. Most of the effect 
is given by the formation models used in the context of formal training cours-
es, to which the trainer looks in a specular way in the construction of strategies 
for action. This results in the emergence of a dual determination, biological and 
cultural, which, precisely by virtue of its dual value, opens the way to pedagog-
ical interventions aimed at trainers and aimed at revising the processes of mod-
elling the educational action.
Only an approach balancing autonomy and heteronomy makes a project of 
education feasible for free and responsible choice, which is played between 
change and resistance to it. The biological perspective allows us to guarantee 
the possibility of change by promoting the conservation of autonomy since the 
specification of the connections forming between the neurons is not contained 
in the genes; rather, it results from the random interaction with the environment.
Connections permanence is guaranteed by genes as long as they are “deemed 
useful”. Therefore, this is the result of a causal process: genes provide the spec-
ifications for those processes arousing the growth of immense populations of 
neurons – a number of neurons higher than what will be actually used by our 
brain – and said neurons emit random exploratory branches. Thus, many of 
these neurons connect to other neurons in useful ways (considered useful by the 
unintentional processes of brain pruning). These successful connections tend to 
survive, while the missing connections die, so they are dismantled to recycle 
their parts a few days later for the next generation of promising neuronal devel-
opment (Dennett, 2003).
As previously stated, a bio-pedagogical study about intentionality did not 
refute the theoretical assumptions outlined by the traditional pedagogical inves-
tigation; rather, it constituted a deepening of the latter.
Reinterpreting some authors gives to the research a new perspective. We re-
fer, for instance, to Husserl and his Cartesian Meditations or to Merleau-Ponty 
with the Phenomenology of Perception. Somehow, those authors support 
the possibility of deepening the studies about intentionality, which is em-
bodied through contributions ripening in the cognitive sciences. On the oth-
er hand, a chance is given by the most recent and mature suggestions of the 
bio-pedagogical investigation that, owning the paradigm of complex dynamic 
systems, overcome a mechanistic perspective of education. Therefore, opening 
to a problematic interpretation of the individual-environment relationship, ac-
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cording to which the environment that triggers the dynamics of change, is “me-
tabolized through a device that is certainly much more intricate and complex 
than the adaptive operation”.
During the 1990s, Frauenfelder carried out significant studies in this re-
gard, starting from Maturana’s and Varela’s hypothesis, according to which liv-
ing beings are autopoietic systems that are able to produce their own identity. 
Frauenfelder claims a “radical redefinition of the concept of adaptation that, ac-
cording to the traditional definition, used to consider the environment as the or-
igin of the system changes’; in this sense, the input-output scheme is dominant, 
and the adaptation is defined as a response of the system to the needs of the en-
vironment. In the new sense, however, what becomes a priority in adaptation is 
the preservation of the autonomy of the system, that is, the conservation of the 
vital cycles defining its organization” (Frauenfelder, 1994, p. 94).
Interpreting the environmental effects on the human system in terms of 
“perturbations” has generated various pedagogical implications. Traditionally, 
in fact, the environment stimulates an adaptive force in the relationship, which 
affects, or it is supposed to affect, the construction of learning with a quantita-
tive-qualitative push, closely linked to the input, depending on it.
This “game”, despite articulating between two elements and depending on 
both elements, finds in the environment something that influences learning, and 
this not only for the direction that originates from the latter (the result) but also 
for the modalities (the process), which, despite being very articulated and dif-
ferentiated, are built in a close relationship with the external.
In contrast, when the input is lived as a “perturbation”, it triggers an auto-
poietic defence process responding to the input by restructuring the subjectivity 
in its entirety. In this passage, in which the maintenance of one’s subjective be-
ing is preponderant, the output becomes, above all, a product of the biological 
subject.
This branch of bio-pedagogical research seems to embrace new investiga-
tive paths for the study of intentionality, assuming the latter in an educational 
way, or meaning it as the engine of every formative process, whether it is for-
mal, non-formal or informal, and denying the possibility of a reduction of con-
sciousness to forgetful explanations of the possibility of an internal/external di-
alectic, to which a process-based reading is opposed, as the result of a structural 
coupling between the organism in its totality (perception, memory, emotion) 
and the environment.
From these assumptions derive three aspects of intentionality: its being a 
constructive, implicit and intersubjective element of human action. These di-
mensions, fully examined by Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical re-
flections and reinterpreted because of experimental studies carried out in the 
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cognitive sciences, seem to offer considerable suggestions to the reconsidera-
tion of intentionality in an educational key.
These dimensions support the opening of the bio-pedagogical discourse in 
relation to a reinterpretation of the formative processes from the historical, cul-
tural and biological perspective, and those dimensions support this openness 
because the “biological constants” underlying the intentional processes and set 
in the human organism direct towards a reading of the formative process in 
terms of spatially and temporally defined experiential process.
Starting from these premises, it is necessary to rethink formative strategies, 
and above all, education’s meaning and its “purposes”. The consideration of 
intentionality as emerging and as a co-definition between the subject and the 
environment involves the partial surrender of an investigation that, apart from 
the individual relational contexts, is able to provide “certain” and generalizable 
data when formation models are formulated according to a theoretical/practical 
value. This process culminates in the awareness that formulation’s guide line 
has to explicitly descend from “purposes” as well as from “data”.
Therefore, it is not about “finding in reality” (in a reality somehow inves-
tigated and caught in different ways) the foundation of value and of the edu-
cational action, but finding, instead, in the value the foundation of reality of 
education. Elsewhere, we have already pointed out (Strollo, 2004) how this 
perspective leads, in the field of theoretical and educational research, to the ne-
cessity of a pedagogy “speaking in first person”. In other words, one has to be 
aware that, in every speech construction – even of the pedagogical discourse – a 
decisive role is played by intentionality, which has to be always be explicated, 
in any context within which our “point of view”, our “stance”, or our “choices” 
are expressed.
In fact, research and pedagogical formation intervene in “the theoretical and 
cognitive apparatus, the preferences, the researcher and/or subjects involved 
and their choices of merit and the assumptions of awareness of their constant 
possible transformation; in particular, the knowing subject should construct the 
research based on one’s theoretical reference system, on choosing theories that 
allow for the identification and definition of the epistemic objects, the intersub-
jective exchange between interpretative models”.
One has also to reorganize oneself and one’s research because of the inter-
ferences that the “case” presents as unpredictable conditions of change. Thus, 
when researching, we are able to overcome the empirical residue that inves-
tigates to confirm a hypothesis with facts to enhance the researcher’s auton-
omous and original constructive activity in the aspect of conscious choice of 
categories, theories and procedures and the subsequent coherent selection of 
systems intervention strategies.
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A “pedagogy” that speaks in first person is, therefore, a “pedagogy” that as-
sumes the ethical responsibility of its choices and of the underlying demands 
and, at the same time, while aspiring to approval and sharing, recognizes their 
partiality; it is a pedagogy that respects the plurality of points of view, recog-
nizing their existence, and even encouraging it, even when it does not share the 
others’ proposals.
We assume that every human action, regardless of its nature, as a result of 
intentionality, implies a choice. Therefore, the problem does not concern as 
much one’s right of individual choice as avoiding the transformation into an 
“antecedent and final structure”. We need to explain the choice reasons’ to take 
responsibility in the first person. Since we are creatures with lives to live and 
find ourselves within an uncertain environment, we are constructed to note and 
judge in terms of bearing upon weal and woe upon value. Acknowledgements 
of this fact is a very different thing, however, from the transformation effected 
by philosophers of the traits they find good (simplicity, certainty, nobility, per-
manence, etc.) into fixed traits of real Being. The former presents something to 
be accomplished, to be brought about by the actions in which choice is man-
ifested and made genuine. The latter ignores the need of action to effect the 
better and to prove the honesty of choice; it converts what is desired into the 
antecedent and final features of a reality that is supposed to require only logical 
warrant to be contemplatively enjoyed as true Being (Dewey, 1958).
In other words, the constructive, implicit and intersubjective nature of hu-
man intentionality, although supported by a bio-pedagogical approach allowing 
the identification of its root in the human biological system, generates pluri-di-
rectional and pluri-articulated pedagogical suggestions responding to specific 
cultural and political questions. The following reflections do not constitute an 
a historical and generalizable path, according to a vision of gradual and cumu-
lative progress of the pedagogical knowledge, but rather a need to rethink the 
intentionality underlying the formative processes in response to a cultural and 
democratic question. According to a democratic viewpoint, the bio-pedagogical 
reinterpretation of intentionality produces, in first instance, a twofold path of 
reflection concerning two segments of inquiry – closely interconnected – to 
which a reference was made at the opening of the lecture: the role of intention-
ality in dynamics underlying both people-in-formation processes of change and 
the modelling processes of the training action. Concerning the first segment, we 
have to pass through a conception of the formation process meant as a social 
strategy aimed at achieving a “permanently optimized” equilibrium of individ-
uals with society to a conception that means it in terms of a relational strategy, 
essential to take part to the permanent and disturbing evolutionary process of 
the environment. Equilibrium here is not the correspondence between the in-
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dividual attitudes and performance needs expressed by society at a certain his-
torical moment but rather the subject’s ability to actively participate in social 
change. In other words, the ability to balance the environment is achieved in the 
management and production of innovation. For a long time, the formation pro-
cess has been interpreted in terms of the stable optimization of the relationship 
between the individual and the social environment through the use of heterono-
mous or autonomous strategies. In the case of heteronomous strategies, we start 
from the assumption that at the origins of individual actions, a decisive role is 
played by the cultural and economic constraints posed by the environment.
For example, in the approaches of a structuralist mould, the formative in-
tervention is entirely based on intentionality, which is expressed from the out-
side, and it is very often limited to supply the subjects in formation with useful 
information to benefit from the environmental “possibilities” to build a more 
“secure” project of the self.
In the second case, when the formative intervention aims at stimulating 
one’s autonomous strategies, the individual autonomy, in relation to the envi-
ronmental constraints. increases the “diagnostic” nature of the formative inter-
vention, without leaving space to the needs expressed by sociocultural contexts.
Formation in terms of relational strategy, aimed at active participation in the 
evolutionary process of society, implies that individual actions have to emerge 
from the individual/environmental relationship. According to this hypothesis, 
in fact, the need for social and cultural integration certainly constitutes a limit 
to the autonomy of the individual and to his or her “originality”, as it creates 
cognitive paths and circuits that are consistent with one’s belonging culture and 
eliminates countless potentials (Morin, 1990).
Often, individuals, even in the most closed cultural environments, passively 
obey the social order and cultural injunctions (ivi, p. 25). Every individual, in 
the process of formation, retains a potential for autonomy and divergence with 
respect to social norms and the dominant culture that allows one to resist cul-
tural imprinting and to participate actively in the process of social evolution.
E. Morin recalls that, when in a democratic climate “the dialogue of op-
posing opinions” is established, the ascendant of the environment is reduced, 
and “plurality”, “separations”, “oppositions”, “polycentrism” are introduced. 
Thus begins appear “the imprinting cracks, the breaches in the system of reduc-
tion and change of invariance, the jams in the normalization. All this enlarges 
the ‘individual autonomy’; room. At this point, the subject is able to use one’s 
‘potential for autonomy’ beyond the confines of the ‘private room’” (ivi, p. 40).
In other words, in a democratic climate, formation is the product of the way 
in which the subjects plan their lives in spatially and culturally determined 
contexts; therefore, the formative intervention aims to acquire critical planning 
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of the self, which is played between conservation and change. We outline a 
sense of intentionality so that the subject in formation is induced to grasp what 
the real formative possibilities are. This process occurs through interventions 
aimed at developing the ability to plan one’s life in a flexible and open way to 
change, to produce and cope with innovations, and to actively participate in so-
cial, cultural and economic evolution. Hence, it derives a turning point in ped-
agogical research: the latter cannot limit itself identifying social, cultural and 
historical constraints that trap the individual autonomy, but it also has to build 
conditions that mitigate normalization.
These conditions are realized within a “cognitive democracy” that recogniz-
es, but at the same time, it is able to weaken, the nature of sociocultural deter-
minations that present themselves in a double aspect. On the one hand, those 
are “positive” because they prescribe what one has to think and know; on the 
other hand, they are “negative” because they exclude what one does not have to 
think nor know. “This ‘negative’ nature recognizes the invisible presence of the 
virtual, which is not physically manifest. In fact, every system equipped with 
regulation, that is, of deviance cancellation, is a system that continually elim-
inates a virtual one that could or would like to access existence” (ivi, p. 84).
In this regard, Stuart A. Kauffman in The Origin of Order: Self-Organization 
and Selection in Evolution (1993) formulated a coevolution theory distinguish-
ing between three different equilibrium regimes: an ordered regime in which 
everyone is at the peak of adaptation and in perfect mutual coordination, but in 
which the peaks are moderate; a chaotic regime in which “every time I make a 
change, I put you in trouble, and vice versa. We never reach the heights because 
you keep throwing me backwards and I do the same with you, like Sisyphus 
who tries in vain to push the rock to the top”; and a regime of chaos in which 
the process of coevolution leads the system towards a maximum situation of 
adaptation.
Therefore, starting from a regime of chaos, it begins an orienting process 
meant as an evolutionary change, rather than a static, orderly, “steadily opti-
mized” equilibrium regime.
We have to give away “optimality”, looking for something that works. 
Many people complain, saying, “So are you giving up the best for something 
worse?” No, because optimization is not better defined. What we are trying to 
do is to maximize the resistance, or the ability to survive, in front of a poorly 
defined future. This makes it more important to achieve the greatest awareness 
of non-linear reactions and random paths. The world is scrutinized, and lasting 
circumstances are not expected (Waldrop, 1993, p. 583).
Now, in the coevolutive perspective, every evolution starts from a virtuality 
accessing existence, assuming the shape of deviance, thus becoming a trans-
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forming tendency. Deviance assumes here a positive value: if “deviance” is 
synonymous with autonomy, from the pedagogical point of view, it becomes 
a priority to operate on those traits that present themselves as peculiar charac-
teristics, expressing energy and emotions, inhibition, and non-reflexiveness in 
order to channel them towards socially acceptable paths, while leaving the pe-
culiar subversive and non-conformist character unchanged.
However, for an individual to enjoy these permissive conditions, one had 
been able to take advantage of multiple and multiform possibilities, in one’s ed-
ucation or ineducation, in the relationship with one’s family and friends, when 
meeting a possible protector or in the solution of one’s vital problems, in the 
overcoming or in the sublimation of one’s inner conflicts, in the stimulus repre-
sented by unexpected events, in the favourable conditions of research or medi-
tation (Morin, 1991, p. 53).
In Experience and Nature, Dewey (1958) lingers on the perennial oscillation 
between surrendering to the external world and the affirmation of the internal 
world that conditions individual existence. Dewey claims that only an individ-
ual who does not feel in balance with the environment is then able to change in 
first person and transform the context of belonging:
Thus, an individual existence has a double status and import. There is the in-
dividual that belongs in a continuous system of connected events that reinforce 
its activities and that form a world in which one is at home, consistently at one 
with its own preferences, satisfying its requirements. Such an individual is in 
its world as a member, extending as far as the moving equilibrium of which it 
is a part lends support. It is a natural end, not as an abrupt and immediate ter-
mination but as a fulfilment. Then, there is the individual that finds a gap be-
tween its distinctive bias and the operations of the things through which alone 
its need can be satisfied; it is broken off, discrete because it is at odds with its 
surroundings. It either surrenders, conforms, and for the sake of peace becomes 
a parasitical subordinate, indulges in egotistical solitude; or its activities set out 
to remake conditions in accord with desire. In the latter process, intelligence 
is born not mind which appropriates and enjoys the whole of which it is a part 
but mind as individualized, initiating, adventuring, experimenting, dissolving. 
Its possessed powers, its accomplished unions with the world, are now reduced 
to uncertain agencies to be forged into efficient instrumentalities in the stress 
and strain of trial. The individual, the self, centred in a settled world that owns 
and sponsors it, and which in turn it owns and enjoys, is finished, closed. Sur-
render of what is possessed, disowning of what supports one in secure ease, is 
involved in all inquiry and discovery; the latter implicate an individual still to 
make, with all the risks implied therein. Arriving at new truth and vision is to 
alter. The old self is put out and the new self is only forming, and the form it fi-
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nally takes will depend upon the unforeseeable result of an adventure (Dewey, 
1958, p. 183).
Starting from these considerations, the formative intervention cannot subju-
gate oneself to an external norm, but rather, it has to help oneself achieve one’s 
potentialities, even in the awareness of the limits posed by the environment.
This perspective undermines many of the criteria that have governed the 
formative relationship, first of all its “optimization”, understood in terms of 
anticipated planning, according to the canons of an adaptation theory, tending 
to the a priori selection of the significant inputs for learning, or a radically con-
structivist theory that focuses on the diagnosis of the organizational needs of 
the learning structure, developed by each individual.
However, it becomes a priority the attention given to the phenomenolog-
ical datum meant as a space of “formative possibility”, where paradoxically, 
it is the act of maladjustment that can lead to an evolution of the relational 
context.
A pedagogy that speaks in first person and that uses as internal regulatory 
devices those same instances of which it is a spokesperson – tolerance, sharing, 
dialogue, the legitimacy of the plurality of points of view – is concretized in 
paths that enable future trainers to make conscious and critical choices through 
the understanding, control and management of as many alternatives as possi-
ble, since only this makes man truly free: increasing the spectrum of possi-
ble choices, transforming individual and contextual constraints in resources for 
self-orientation.
It seems to be a concrete way to spread an idea of pedagogy that is not uni-
laterally resolved in a “pedagogy of the subject” or in a “pedagogy of the envi-
ronment”, becoming instead, a “pedagogy of the relationship”. If it is true that 
all knowledge emerges from a specific context of relationships, then it is nec-
essary that the trainers are aware of their relationship with knowledge, recog-
nizing their limitations and temporariness. They have to open themselves to the 
umbildung, without ever losing that multiplicity of points of reference related 
to the political and cultural context in which their experience goes on and will 
be developed.
Regarding the role of intentionality in the processes of modelling the form-
ative action, the emphasis on the three dimensions, which are the constructive, 
implicit and intersubjective dimensions peculiar to the human being, underlines 
how each individual model of formation is influenced by intuitive and scientific 
theories disseminated in a specific historical period.
Trainers, while becoming aware of that “knowledge” which is peculiar to 
one’s belonging culture, confront themselves with interpretation models deriv-
ing from different theoretical matrixes of the formative process. They also com-
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pare themselves with models that present some conflicting operational reper-
cussions, depending on the perspective assumed when those were formulated. 
Said models integrating themselves with the implicit pedagogy will constitute 
the future trainer references’, whom one has to look in a specular way while 
building strategies for action.
Regardless, in a “closed” cultural environment, the action models refer to a 
single theoretical matrix. In contrast, in an environment characterized by “com-
plexity” (meant as the coexistence and legitimacy of a plurality of perspectives, 
corresponding to multiple assumptions), the first need is to distinguish between 
models of different matrixes, to avoid a synthesis of conflicting positions, ac-
cording to a cumulative view of knowledge, giving rise to disorganized and in-
consistent strategies.
A few words must be spent about the awareness of the action model’s im-
plicit nature. This thesis has introduced in the last decade’s pedagogical land-
scape a multiplicity of practical and operational paths aimed at forming the 
trainers, attributable to the narrative and autobiographical branches. These are 
strategies that recognize the role of the personal experience in the development 
of models for educational action.
However, the autobiographical dimension does not exempt from the for-
mal dimension’s recovery of pedagogical trainers’ formation. This recovery 
seems to occur through a rethinking of the planning and persuasive function, 
and hence of the formative/formal one, as well as the heuristic, of pedagogical 
knowledge.
A conflict between theory and praxis is then outlined: pedagogy seems to 
have unanimously assumed, concerning the research, a disciplinary status con-
scious of its plurality and non-univocity. On the other hand, the initial and on-
going formation of trainers seems to translate this plurality into unidirectional 
paths, unsuspecting of “possible alternatives”, sometimes risking denying, “in 
the name of complexity”, the complexity itself.
Opening to the analysis of contemporary training models (according to a 
synchronic-comparative perspective and not only a historical-comparative one) 
provides the opportunity to consciously choose both the reference model and 
more adequate operational tools. Therefore, it will be possible to carefully re-
view these tools through the activation of self-reflection devices.
Finally, the comparative approach to the models of formation, while ad-
mitting its political and cultural “non-neutrality”, seems to allow the trainers 
to become active builders of the theoretical assumptions useful to explaining 
their formative experience, rather than providing an external interpretation 
framework that would limit the possibility of critical choices and therefore the 
“freedom” of the trainer.
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The trainer is essentially required for reflection and self-reflection. One 
needs to be continually challenged to bring out and criticize the tacit under-
standings arising from the experiences of a practice mostly marked by rep-
etition. If it is true that previous experiences condition the individual biog-
raphies and determine the subsequent decisions of one’s action, however, it 
is necessary to plan one’s actions also depending on the specificities of the 
context (Jarvis, 2004, p. 61 sgg.). Concerning this segment, educators’ initial 
formation collides with a representation of the psychological, pedagogical and 
didactic disciplines that give rise to system of expectations. Sometimes, we 
focus more on the acquisition of techniques and practical strategies that can 
be generalized rather than on the enrichment of theoretical reflection and on 
the acquisition of a self-reflexive competence concerning one’s professional 
action.
Therefore, it is not considered that educational practices, in order to be 
“scientifically” managed, controlled and evaluated, require a theoretical aware-
ness regarding the educational process from which to choose the most suitable 
tools for their achievement.
We often expect traditional scientific strategies, which can be generalized 
in every educational context, thus allowing for the achievement of formative 
objectives. These objectives are identified through the traditional measure of 
attention and the quantitative acquisition of contents or through an uncritical 
assumption of behavioural attitudes, sometimes with a clear nostalgia for the 
“good old days”, in which education was regulated by norms shared by trainers 
and subjects in formation or to which the subject in formation was passively 
adaptable.
In fat, the reasons for the gap between the educational agencies’ formative 
provision and the response to the latter by the new generations are primarily 
socio-political and cultural before they are technical. Let us take the school as 
an example: the distance between what happens inside and outside the school 
becomes more and more consistent, without the school being able to open itself 
to the economic, political and cultural changes of the processes underlying the 
modification of society structures’ (such as immigration, family, role of women, 
political manipulation of sources of information, etc.).
In front of these changes, schools’ educational proposals remain largely un-
altered if compared to the past. Thus, the spectrum of the cultural downfall, 
feared because of the mass education process, has become an irrefutable reality 
today. That happens because the schooling process was not followed by a crisis 
of schools’ elitist conceptions in terms of content and methodologies.
In evolving societies, the school can no longer be understood as a place of 
transmission as in static societies but rather as a ground of effort and meeting 
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for the analysis and re-elaboration of cultural contents, so that a “critical” for-
mation of the learners should take place. For example, there might be people 
who are open to change and who are capable of adapting to new situations 
– which are unpredictable in a civilization in continuous rapid and accelerat-
ed change and development – in the sense of being themselves in continuous 
innovative growth in harmony with the progress of which they are operating 
subjects.
On the other hand, the school continues to be the place where a rigidly dis-
ciplined culture is transmitted. Even those who are unrelated to it disregard the 
contents of the experience in most of the students. This is a legitimate model 
too, but not the only possible one.
Currently, in the pedagogical discourse, we are faced with a plurality of 
models that define different and often conflicting goals – consider the debate on 
the history texts or that concerning the possibility of excluding the Darwinian 
theory from the scholastic programmes – but all them are, at the same time, le-
gitimate. In fact, they are the expression of different cultural and political points 
of view, and it is necessary for the teacher to take a position on those point of 
view. One has to know the historical, political and cultural origins, the prece-
dents that contributed to their genesis and physiognomy, before worrying to ac-
quire the most suitable technique for achieving the objectives identified by the 
models themselves.
One of the pedagogy tasks of is to train the educators, including teachers, 
to identify the links between the reflection on the different pedagogical models 
and the practical and operational consequences that derive from them, analysed 
in depth and not superficially through common sense. It is a matter of teach-
ing trainers to continually reckon with their beliefs and personal reasons and to 
take responsibility for them in terms of defining the objectives and the identi-
fied training strategies. Definitively, it is about making up the conditions so that 
constant feedback can be created between the individual, his or her profession 
and society.
This exchange can be greatly amplified by conscious self-reflection. The 
process of learning – of the growth of subjective knowledge – is always fun-
damentally the same. It is imaginative criticism. This is how we transcend our 
local and temporal environment: by trying to think of circumstances beyond 
our experience; by trying to find, construct, invent and anticipate new situations 
(that is, test situations and critical situations); and by trying to locate, detect, 
and challenge our prejudices and habitual assumptions (Popper, 1972).
From what has been described, a need has emerged to provide the trainers 
with systematic tools to revise their “spontaneous educational action” so that 
they become autonomous and active constructors of the theoretical assump-
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tions that can be interpreted by their formative experience, rather than provid-
ing theoretical and practical frameworks.
Schön argues that when someone reflects in action, he becomes a researcher 
in the practice context. He is not dependent on the categories of established the-
ory and technique but rather constructs a new theory of the unique case. His in-
quiry is not limited to a deliberation about means that depends on a prior agree-
ment about ends. He does not keep means and ends separate but rather defines 
them interactively as he frames a problematic situation. He does not separate 
thinking from doing, ratiocinating his way to a decision he must later convert 
to action. Because his experimenting is a kind of action, implementation is built 
into his inquiry. Thus, reflection-in-action can proceed, even in situations of un-
certainty or uniqueness (Schön, 1983, p. 88 sgg.).
If intentionality associated with values consists in the possibility of exer-
cising free and responsible choices among a plurality of possibilities “deemed 
useful”, it will be necessary to educate the mind-brain system in the following 
areas:
• to build a plurality of choice routes;
• to identify and explain the reasons from which a choice emerges on the 
others.
In fact, intentionality assuming voluntary action models cannot be consid-
ered intrinsic to the human being or the result of a simple interaction with the 
environment. Rather, it is the outcome of relational processes that enable or in-
hibit the emancipation from imprinting’s dual imprisonment. On the hand, we 
have the “natural” one, which is connected to the construction of the neuronal 
structure based on the experiences. On the other hand, we have the cultural 
imprinting, given by cultural impositions, those that Richard Dawkins (1976) 
call memes, cultural replicators analogous to genes. Thus, our “dispositional 
knowledge” results from the transmission of some behaviours from one gener-
ation to another. Starting from this transmission, the so-called “common sense” 
is generated, that is, the set of what everyone considers obvious, within a cer-
tain community, and at a given moment in history, a practical knowledge that 
manifests itself in the unreflected actions of daily life and in the immediate in-
terpretation of reality and of the people around us.
Its contents are defined by the tradition existing within the confines of a 
given community transmitted from one generation to another. The assumptions 
are taken for granted, as common sense coincides with “what everyone thinks 
that the others think”. The common sense generated by memes is, therefore, a 
sort of cognitive routine, a socially shared habit, an automatism deriving from 
an agreement about the relevant aspects in a given situation, and it helps one in 
“understanding the meaning that is appropriate to a context”.
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The world of knowledge, expectations and theories about what surrounds 
us is a universe created by man, but at the same time, it is largely autonomous: 
despite being a human product, knowledge in turn creates its own area of au-
tonomy (Popper, 1972). Precisely because of this reason, no one who wants to 
actively interact with the environment in which one is inserted, can forget the 
cultural heritage of the context in which one operates. Anyway, one can’t limit 
oneself without developing one’s own specific self-understanding conjectures, 
referring to one’s location in physical and social space”. The problematic con-
dition that “constructs/reconstructs” the knowledge resulting from contempo-
rary epistemology requires developing the ability to hunt any form of reduc-
tionism and dogmatism (even that which, as is always possible, is relative to 
the complexity itself) as well as to enhance “glances from far away” on the 
event-knowledge and to read it en structure and in evolution, according, in par-
ticular, with a progressive principle (here and now) of complication, of growth 
of optics and levels, of points of view and of interferences and mutual relations, 
and then of recontextualization and interrogations of meaning.
In this context, it seems necessary to recover the pedagogical formation of 
the trainers meant as a vehicle to transmit memes. This recovery does not seem 
to happen except through a rethinking of the design, persuasive and therefore 
formative/formal, as well as the heuristic function of pedagogical knowledge. 
This knowledge, when researching, seems to have unanimously assumed a dis-
ciplinary status aware of its plurality and not univocity. It also seems to translate 
this plurality into one-way paths and not proposing them in terms of a “possible 
alternative”, both on the side of trainers’ initial and in itinere formation. In his 
book Freedom Evolves, Daniel C. Dennett warns against the danger that the 
educational processes might be converted into an “engineering of values” that 
circumvents people’s ability to control their mental activities. Self-control of 
our mental activities is limited and problematic in any case, so we should not 
be surprised at our difficulty in distinguishing between an engineering that by-
passes our capabilities and an engineering that exploits them in a tolerable and 
desirable way. As long as you tell people the truth – or what passes for the truth 
at the time you tell it – and eschew efforts to mislead them, and as long as you 
leave them in a state from which they can make at least as good of an independ-
ent assessment of their predicament as before you intervened, then you are ed-
ucating them, not brainwashing them. (Dennett, 2003).
Colicchi (2004, p. 171) also claims that once having accepted that edu-
cational practices and the reasons for education are rooted in the biological 
and sociobiological reality of human beings, it is necessary to re-evaluate the 
spontaneous intelligence – made up of ways of being and acting, of dispo-
sitions, attitudes and know-how, and of volitions and memories (that are al-
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ways) of real subjects in flesh and blood – that governs immediate educational 
behaviours.
The educational actions are modelled starting from meaning perspectives, 
that is, the series of assumptions from which previous experience is assimilat-
ed, transforming a new experience.
Jack Mezirow (1991) distinguishes three different perspectives of mean-
ing, namely, epistemological, sociolinguistic and psychological, identifying 
a series of factors that condition, limit or distort this perspective. Among the 
factors that influence the epistemological perspectives are the importance of 
awareness and reflexivity, which contribute to the definition of the schemes of 
meaning, i.e., that set of knowledge, beliefs, judgements of value and feelings 
that guide our actions, needing a continuous critical examination, from which 
it is possible to make a transformation of the perspective that generates new 
modes of action.
The reflection and criticism make it possible to become aware of the specific 
assumptions on which a distorted or incomplete perspective meaning is based, 
transforming it through a reorganization of meaning. The process of explicat-
ing/reviewing the modalities of action begins with a doubtful or problematic 
scheme of meaning and proceeds through the exploration, analysis, memory, 
intuition, imagination, straight to the construction of a new interpretation that 
generates a reflexive change in the original scheme of meaning, enriching it, 
integrating it and transforming it: when the new interpretation effectively puts 
into question an entire perspective of meaning, it can lead to a transformation 
of perspective. Starting from this process, emancipatory learning consists of 
freedom from instinctive, linguistic, epistemological, institutional and environ-
mental issues that limit our options and control over our lives. We reach this 
emancipation by critically examining our assumptions.
The purpose is to first explore potential hybrid theories and methodologies 
that will help to explicate specific and immediate moments of learning, such as 
situated learning as well as embodied and enactive and transformative learn-
ing, and second, to advocate for the use of a pedagogical portfolio assessment 
and praxis that is appropriate for adult learners and that values these ways of 
learning. Accordingly, we will synthesize specific ways of learning (situated, 
embodied, enactive) with a neurophenomenologically inspired pedagogy and 
praxis for the purpose of liberating these ways of learning from educational 
subjugation. Following a neurophenomenological perspective, we should talk 
about situated learning, which means that from a situated perspective, learning 
is the gradual appropriation, through guided participation, of the ability to par-
ticipate in culturally defined, socially situated activities and practices (see also 
Lave & Wenger, 1991). For Lave and Wenger (1991), “learning is not merely 
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situated in practice – as if it were some independently reifiable process that just 
happened to be located somewhere; learning is an integral part of a generative 
social practice in the lived-in world” (p. 35).
Embodied cognition is a prereflective perception, thinking, and learning that 
emerges from the lived body in action (Gallagher, 2005). As Merleau-Ponty 
(1945) states, our body has its world, or understands its world, without having 
to make use of my ‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying’ function (pp. 140-141). When 
thoughts, choices, and attitudes are considered at one with the proprioceptive, 
sensorimotor, and perceptual body, this helps us understand a diversity of ways 
in which humans learn. Enactive cognition and learning suggest that perceiv-
ing, thinking, and learning are actively inseparable from our meaningful en-
gagement with the environment (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). Francisco 
Varela (1999) tells us that enaction includes “coupling of the cognitive agent, 
a permanent coping that is fundamentally mediated by sensorimotor activities” 
as well as “the autonomous activities of the agent whose identity is based on 
emerging, endogenous configurations (or self-organizing patterns) of neural 
activity” (ivi, p. 272). Interpretively, enaction implies that learning occurs by 
“… having a body with various sensorimotor capacities [and …] these individ-
ual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing 
biological, psychological, and cultural context” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 
1991, p. 173). It is important to note that these couplings are not determining 
or causal of the active (learning) agent. The same neurophenomenology began 
as a theory that emerged from the melding of neuroscience with phenomenolo-
gy, which in turn shaped enaction, weaving together the phenomenological and 
neurobiological, in order to bridge the gap between subjective experience and 
biology, which defines the aim of neurophenomenology as an offshoot of the 
“enactive approach”. As a theory, neurophenomenology considers the interrela-
tionship between neuroscience and phenomenology as potentially enlightening. 
It provides a plausible account of the need for naturalizing phenomenology as 
well as grounding neuroscience in the lived experiences of people.
A pedagogical praxis is meant to liberate previously unrecognized styles of 
learning (e.g., situated, embodied, enactive), thus informing new ways of teach-
ing (Cranton, 1996). The term praxis is used for research that puts into action 
a method for practical and laboratory results (Depraz, 1999; Kincheloe, 2005). 
Praxis also denotes a movement “beyond objectivism and relativism” towards 
an ongoing critical engagement with knowledge claims. A practice as described 
herein will be phenomenological in its approach as it seeks to qualitatively 
understand transformative learning (Mezirow, 1991). Transformative learn-
ing highlights what the adult learning agent interpretively brings to any given 
learning situation to transform previous knowledge paradigms. A phenomeno-
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logical practice may emphasize the prereflective lived experiences of learning 
by gathering first-person, reflexive narratives of the ‘how’ of situated, enactive, 
and embodied learning experiences to better understand the transformative di-
mensions related to the learning agent as intimately interrelated with the learn-
ing situation (see Vittoria, Strollo, Romano & Brock, 2014).
Theorists have combined brain-based learning (i.e., insights from brain re-
search) with education focused primarily on the child’s development to enhance 
teaching and learning (Blackemore & Frith, 2005); however, studies have not 
utilized neurophenomenology and research concerning the adult learner.
Learning, by its very nature, is a complex and fascinating phenomenon due 
to its associations with sociocultural norms, formal and informal educational 
methods, and psychology and neuroscience. These diverse disciplines all have 
something to contribute to our knowledge of learning precisely because learn-
ing is an all-encompassing aspect of living. Consequently, there has been, and 
ought to be, many ways of studying the experience of learning using varying 
perspectives or techniques. Commonly understood, learning (to learn) means 
gaining knowledge of and being informed (informed connotes inward change 
and formation). Learning can be understood as the collection of facts, insti-
gating of change, and storing of information. Learning may not have a fully 
formed beginning and end, and it may not be so easily separated from other 
cognitive activities – nor does learning seem to be, as we will see, a passive 
process of containment (Gardner, 1983; Maturana & Varela, 1987). Learning 
might best be described as diffuse (belonging to multiple contexts), whereby 
any learning experience can be understood as an embedded and emergent social 
phenomenon (Lave & Wenger, 1991).
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Second Part
From intentionality to awareness:  
a matter of practices.
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Trainers’ pedagogical formation constitutes a problem for the pedagogist. In 
fact, no researcher has yet found a valid solution for how this formation should 
take place, and scholars are constantly looking for new solutions.
The link between professional epistemological awareness and, more gener-
ally, trainers and educators’ formation involves pedagogical thinking on a dou-
ble level. The first one is related to the educational and didactic action of the 
educator while forming other professional educators. The second concerns the 
goals of this action aimed at enabling effective educational and didactic actions. 
Therefore, we do not only have to think about what pedagogical models are the 
most suitable for future educators’ actions. We also have to bear in mind which 
pedagogical models are the most suitable for their own formation.
These two levels seem to be inseparable: only a reflective professional can 
form a reflective professional.
Thus, a pedagogist should include himself in his object of investigation, 
practising it in first person. Otherwise, he would deny what he says with what 
he does.
One educator’s education assumes as a priority objective that of becoming a 
reflective professional, so that one would be able to build knowledge in a situa-
tion. Nevertheless, the basis of this construction should be the link between for-
mal knowledge and experience from which plot, it emerges the representation 
of the situation in which this knowledge is going to build itself. It comes out the 
need to build formative strategies allowing formal knowledge to “experience” 
as a preliminary step to the construction of strategic competences of a reflexive, 
proactive and epistemological nature.
Restricting oneself to a “transmission” of the notion that learning is based 
on experience, i.e., through a formal lesson, may look like a denial, through the 
didactic action, of what one aims to teach. Perhaps the goal should be that the 
one leading the trainers in formation to act and learn through action should be-
come aware of what it means to learn through practice.
Introduction
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This necessity involves the educator’s professional epistemology, since the 
link between knowledge and practice is a problem that cannot concern the in-
itial formation with regard to the acquisition of strategic skills. In particular, 
Bruner’s lesson about the genesis and function of popular pedagogy teaches us 
that the meaning that the educator gives to his own experiences has a deep im-
pact on his professional practice.
Therefore, how much does the pedagogist’s academic experience affect his 
way of organizing an educational intervention?
It might have a significant impact and might lead to the structuring of for-
mation in terms of reflection. Sometimes, this formation might be followed by 
a workshop to confirm what has been learned from a theoretical point of view. 
Therefore, would the pedagogist’s academic experience not deny this model of 
action, having as its didactic objective the emphasis on the experience’s value 
while building one’s knowledge?
In other words, reflecting on the value of experience in the field of formal 
formation might constitute an ability to manage experiential processes. Is it un-
necessary to prove the value of experience?
Hence, the pedagogist focuses on formation in terms of implementation of 
strategies rather than content. He has to address a double problem concerning 
what and how strategies can be learned through the experience in a context 
of initial pedagogical formation. Furthermore, he has to understand what this 
learning involves from the perspective of pedagogy’s didactics.
The first problem is of a more strictly methodological-didactic nature: we 
can illustrate the theme of the link between formal knowledge and experience 
or we can induce it to experiencing it by involving, in the learning process, the 
embodied experience, personal knowledge, which becomes the starting point to 
interpret formal knowledge. It is an “upside down” didactic approach in which 
experience comes before theoretical and formal systematization.
The second problem involves an epistemological change that means peda-
gogy not such a place of a given knowledge transmission but as a place where 
one learns the ability to autonomously manage the process of interpretation and 
construction of the knowledge of the formative process in an educational way. 
It is not a matter of renouncing a personal point of view about the educational 
process. It is about making the freedom of choice critical to the purpose of ped-
agogical formation.
We are far from assuming that it is not possible, at all, to form without tak-
ing into account the need for autonomy of the subject in formation. It seems 
that in the current cultural context, this objective is truly, and fortunately, diffi-
cult to reach. Resuming Dennett’s (2003) fitting expression, an “engineering of 
values” can be realized in a closed cultural climate in which the dialectic of the 
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opposing opinions is not in force and a sort of continuity is achieved between 
the educational models experienced in a pre-reflexive way during one’s own 
educational story and explicit models enjoyed during formal formation.
Sometimes, it seems that the second problems deny the first problems while 
building, on the one hand, the premises for freedom, which consists of the 
knowledge of innumerable possibilities of choice between models of action. 
On the other hand, even the presuppositions for actions that are not that coher-
ent as a result of synthesis operations between models unconsciously acted.
Thus, freedom of choice is, now more than ever, the necessary condition to 
manage learning in action and the conscious construction of knowledge capa-
ble of coping with problems encountered in practice. There is no possibility, 
underlying the freedom of choice, of knowing the authoritative ways in which 
it is possible to act at a given moment, using a priori valid clues or in general 
indicating what behaviours have to be adopted to address certain problematic 
situations. Instead, it is possible to develop the capacity to autonomously read 
the context and to compare various ways of acting. One can autonomously act 
even at the cost of making mistakes, that mistake on which we will reflect and 
that will produce embodied knowledge, becoming a guide for the future.
Therefore, the assumption of a highly empirical attitude becomes a priori-
ty, accompanied by attention to the phenomenological datum understood as a 
space of “formative possibility”, whose critical and flexible management satis-
fies some of the ever emerging anthropological and existential instances, which 
are perceived as priorities: sharing, tolerance, difference, openness to dialogue.
Here, we aim to analyse the operational effects related to educational in-
tentionality from a neurophenomenological perspective. Taking up what was 
reconstructed in the first part of the volume, the three characteristics of inten-
tionality, its being enactive, implicit and intersubjective, need to be metacogni-
tively learned by those who approach the educational professions.
Starting from these premises, the Laboratory of Epistemology and ed-
ucational practices of the University of Naples Federico II has built strat-
egies to support the awareness of the processes of construction of the edu-
cational action through various paths. Those paths include the following: the 
Mindfulness Laboratory, which specifically complies with the enactive feature; 
the Laboratory of Musical Autobiography, which relates to the characteristic 
of the implicit; the Laboratory of Education to Listening, which concerns the 
intersubjective dimension; and the multimedia Laboratory of Epistemology of 
Education, which concerns all three characteristics of intentionality.
As we anticipated, these are “upside down” strategies allowing the student 
to first confront these issues with practice, constructing a theory through a log-
book and then comparing it with the formal knowledge of the printed text. In 
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addition, what amazement and joy catches him when he finds written what he 
had independently built passing through “action”. The comparison with formal 
knowledge becomes the tool to systematize Bruner’s “popular pedagogy” that 
emerged during the experience and while writing a logbook.
In all three strategies, writing plays an important role as a metacognitive tool 
and consequently a self-reflexive and knowledge-building tool.
In this regard, the logbook is a discursive, descriptive and qualitative tool 
that highlights the participants’ experiences.
It is a tool for self-reflection and meaningful learning through the re-elab-
oration of the links between theory-practice-theory. The logbook is a timely 
narrative of the events experienced by the group and the single participants. It 
privileges a concrete language, and the description must not leave anything out. 
It is the story of an educational journey to be narrated in its complexity of pro-
cess, whether related to emotional, cognitive, social and political aspects. The 
tool proves to be precious to monitoring the activities, reflecting on the dynam-
ics carried out, self-evaluating, recording the level of participation, some en-
compassing “unexpected contingencies” (such as conflicts or discussions) and 
the difficulties encountered.
Compared to a narrative or semi-structured interview, the logbook is config-
ured as an extemporaneous and expressive narrative; the subject does not have 
to respond to inductive inputs. This difference acquires value compared to the 
researcher’s interest in exploring the intra-individual and interpersonal percep-
tive and subjective processes with which an experience can be crossed, in this 
case, an educational experience.
The logbook serves both as a lens and a mirror of observation and self-ob-
servation, as a report of what happened during and after the experience, and as 
metacognitive writing to rethink, relocate, and reorganize sensations and de-
scriptions, as well as to raise questions to answer while writing.
The logbook highlights the weight of critical and significant events both 
individual and of the whole group of participants involved, emphasizing the 
self-emerging aspects in the narratives that may be common to the students or 
that can be perceived in a divergent way by one student to the other. The reflec-
tion that we carried out requires an “epistemological break” (Strollo 2014) to 
analyse the concrete acts but also the presuppositions, the meanings, the con-
texts and the educational framework, bringing to light the implicit and the un-
said that subtly seep in the complexus of the lived experience.
Starting from the literature on metacognition and self-efficacy, during the 
aforementioned Laboratory of epistemology and educational practices, a grid 
was built so that students could make a first reflection on the processes involved 
in the laboratory experience.
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Report of the experience
While building the hypertext, I have followed these steps: first, I have…
Because…
The thread that holds all my knowledge together (i.e., how I connected my 
knowledge) …
During the realization of the task, it happened that…
The construction of … for me was an experience…
The most emotional moments were…
I believe that this is a type of task…
It requires the ability to…
If I had to redo this experience, I would change…
To a colleague of mine, I would recommend…
A metaphor for my path is… because…
As a student, the course taught me that…
Thus, I would use the strategy that I experienced in my professional activity…
The first point concerns the awareness of the cognitive moves that the stu-
dent has used to carry out the new task. In addition, it has to do with procedural 
metacognition and the planning phase addressing the self-efficacy cycle.
The second point addresses the reconstruction of one’s knowledge map and 
the aspects that best characterize one’s own experience. It is connected to one’s 
becoming aware and to the considerations of performance.
The third point concerns the awareness of the launched actions and of the 
opportunities offered by the tool, connecting to one’s reflections and becoming 
aware of the performance.
The fourth point makes it possible to give meaning to the experience still 
referring to one’s becoming aware and the phase of reflections on the perfor-
mance.
The fifth point allows a meta-emotional reflection, and it is connected to the 
awareness and to the phase of reflections on performance from an emotional 
perspective.
The sixth point implies an interpretative activity of the performed task and 
presents links with the declarative metacognition and monitoring phase.
The seventh point concerns the cognitive position used during the task and 
still, the declarative metacognition and the monitoring phase.
The eighth point implies a reflection on the weak points connected to the 
declarative metacognition and the monitoring phase
I would recommend to a colleague of mine to… involves the identification 
of the correct procedures by the recall of all the phases of the metacognition 
and self-efficacy cycle.
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The last item concerns the ability to connect the acquisition of educational 
objectives.
However, most of the all, it is a spontaneous and creative way of writing, 
that is, with this last term, the ability to newly define and structure one’s own 
experiences and knowledge. It is a tool to remember, explain, and bring out the 
difficulty in asking oneself, distancing oneself, analysing the bodily response, 
and creating connections between present, past and future. “I tried to take into 
consideration everything that came out; I wrote down the memories even in a 
fragmented way so as not to lose anything” (from the diary of a student).
In the inner dialogue, we are supported with writing so that “we distance 
ourselves from what we hear, observe, experience”, as well as from what we 
listen to, observe, and live in the hic et nunc: “by separating ourselves by writ-
ing, we look better at the object that we want to know, ourselves in first place” 
(Demetrio, 2003, p. 173).
Self-analytical writing realizes an original setting that allows, at the same 
time, authenticity emerge, “favoured and nourished from the highlighted pro-
cesses of a healthy splitting that writing generates: I write (as a non-patient 
writer) to someone who reads me (to me, a non-patient reader) and, in this way, 
I establish an internal dialectic that changes me and the other, where protec-
tion for both […] here is controlled by writing” (ivi, p. 176). In conclusion, the 
attempt of contemporary pedagogy is to seek new ways for the formation of 
trainers and teachers through which the value of action emerges as a vehicle of 
meaningful learning and, as such, of transformation.
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Conventionally, the metacognitive approach is often used in the scholastic en-
vironment, but in the last decade, various approaches have been developed, 
promoting metacognitive skills in the formation of professional educators. In 
this context, the research and the interventions that start from the assumption 
that the teachers, having to address extremely variable situations, need to ben-
efit from a “transactive” metacognitive competence that allows them to adapt 
their behaviour to the context and, at the same time, to change the context. The 
goal is to help professional educators recognize that many situations that are 
apparently routine actually require an adjustment that allows them to communi-
cate and properly negotiate values within the relational context (Lin, Schwartz 
& Hatano, 2005). General knowledge broadly includes applicable strategies for 
problem solving, creative thinking, decision-making processes, learning and 
good mental organization (Perkins & Salomon, 1989, p. 17). General cognitive 
skills do not work as if something took the place of domain-specific knowledge, 
nor even if they operated exactly the same way from domain to domain. Rather, 
cognitive skills are general tools, similar to the human hand. General cognitive 
skills can be thought of as general devices to recover and grasp specific domain 
knowledge to handle and configure it. Compared to academic programmes, it is 
no longer a matter of educating memories or teaching content and knowledge 
but rather of educating minds (Perkins & Salomon, 1989, p. 24), which is what 
education should address.
Recent studies have led to reflection on the nature, origins and development 
of the ways in which students regulate their learning processes (Zimmermann, 
2002, p. 46). Although these studies have clearly shown how self-regulation 
processes lead students to academic success, few teachers currently prepare 
students to learn on their own.
During the early eighties of the twentieth century, a new perspective on stu-
dents’ individual differences began to emerge from research on metacognition 
1. Tools of the enactive teaching:  
metacognitive writing
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and social cognition. In this context, “metacognition” is defined as the aware-
ness of knowledge of one’s own thought. Student deficits in learning were at-
tributed to a lack of metacognitive awareness of personal limitations and an 
inability to provide for this lack.
“Social cognition” researchers have been interested in social influences con-
cerning children’s development of self-regulation. They have also studied issues 
such as the effects of teacher modelling and education on students’ goal-setting 
and self-monitoring skills (ivi, p. 65). The results led the researchers to attribute 
individual differences in learning to students’ lack of self-regulation.
This perspective focused on what the students needed to know about them-
selves to control their limits during learning attempts. The educators’ goal 
should be that of making students strong enough to become aware of these dif-
ferences. The most important aspect of this work is the development of a capac-
ity for self-regulation, a self-directed process through which those who learn 
transform their mental skills into learning skills. The latter is considered an ac-
tivity that the students perform for themselves in a proactive way, rather than 
in response to the stimulation of the teacher, which has important repercussions 
in the field of pedagogy.
Metacognition is about promoting a meta-reflective professional compe-
tence and critical thinking with a referral to one’s own modalities of action. 
It involves the gaze that a person places on one’s learning process and the 
metacognitive knowledge (of people, of the task and strategies), the manage-
ment of one’s mental activity (planning, control and regulation) and the aware-
ness of the elements of these two first components.
Despite sometimes leading to other names, the management of the mental ac-
tivity generally has similar aspects as referents: the actions implemented when 
a task is being carried out, the ongoing evaluation and the adjustments chosen 
according to the evaluation. If metacognition is developed, critical thinking is 
encouraged because the student self-evaluates (self-correction), reacts accord-
ing to the situation (sensitive to the context), or checks one’s solutions (express-
es judgements). Without reflecting on oneself, the individual maintains his own 
tendencies, distortions and prejudices, especially if he is intellectually skilled 
at rationalizing and arguing to give acceptable appearances to his preconceived 
opinions (ivi, pp. 55-56).
We can define metacognitive didactics as a transformative learning device 
that acts on the perspective of meaning that concerns the structure of psycho-
logical and cultural assumptions from which our previous experience assimi-
lates and transforms the new experience. It is a framework of reference com-
posed of our dispositional knowledge, that is, the set of correlated expectations 
that control cause-effect relationships, roles, social action, our way of being, 
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values, and the connections between feelings and actions. It guides the way we 
live, feel, understand, judge and practically manage our situation.
Dispositional knowledge constitutes a personal paradigm involving the cog-
nitive, conative (volitive) and affective dimensions. It prepares us to action. 
By defining our expectations, it selects what we learn and the way we learn it 
(Mezirow, 1991, p. 12).
Because of the critical and metacognitive capacity, “However, random, 
limited or unreliable may be the patterns and perspectives of meanings that 
we acquire during childhood and youth, adulthood gives us the opportunity 
to make a critical assessment, undertaking corrective actions. With maturity, 
adults can acquire a new capacity for critical reflection and a new way of in-
terpreting reality through a greater awareness of the relevance of the context” 
(ivi, p. 13).
Through metacognitive competence, it is possible, therefore, to promote a 
process that makes one critically aware of how and why the structure of our 
psychocultural assumptions came to condition the way we perceive the world. 
This competence is useful in rebuilding that structure to be more inclusive and 
more discriminating while integrating an experience and acting with anew 
awareness. Transforming a perspective is a process that helps adults recognize 
the introjected roles and relationships of dependence, understand what deter-
mined them, and take action to overcome them (ibidem).
In this context, self-monitoring is decisive, concerning the awareness of 
thought and “the ability to reflect on it (that is, planning and modifying the 
thoughts, according to the activity or the learning goal)”. Therefore, self-mon-
itoring is a process that makes us assume our responsibility in constructing 
a personal meaning through critical reflection. Self-monitoring of the learn-
ing process means ensuring that the knowledge structures – both new and 
pre-existing – are integrated effectively for the achievement of learning pur-
poses (Garrison, 2004, p. 113).
An indispensable tool for metacognitive didactics is undoubtedly writing, 
which presents a reflective relationship with thought by activating processes of 
“outsourcing, mediation, translation and distribution of thought, giving to it the 
opportunity to play between proximity and distance, between the internal and 
external, between subjective and objective”.
In these terms, writing is for thinking that indispensable artefact that sus-
tains it helps it to formalize concepts, constructs, processes, to express itself, 
to settle in culturally connoted intersubjective contexts (which are functional 
not only and not so much to express and document the processes and prod-
ucts of thought but also to activate forms of reflection and self-reflection on 
them).
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Writing feeds awareness and reflexivity within social and educational con-
texts and is considered a fundamental device to develop reflective processes in 
a context of practice, referring to its courses of action.
Then, we can focus on the need to identify forms of writing that allow us to 
feed and record the heuristic and hermeneutical processes in which the complex 
transaction between the dimensions of subjectivity and (individual and social) 
objectivity is played out. Somehow, the diaristic and narrative writing would 
seem to be the best way to document and trace reflexive paths on the individual 
and interindividual level. It is also useful to objectify interpretative hypotheses, 
epistemic positions, investigation paths, as documented by a consolidated tra-
dition of practices and research in international the field.
As Laura Formenti indicates, metacognitive writing has three dimensions. 
The first one (declarative) expresses the representations (of oneself as a student, 
of the studied tasks and subjects, of knowledge); the second one (procedural) 
consists of actions and procedures acted by working, studying and conducting 
self-assessment. Finally, the third dimension, which is the most important but, 
at the same time, which is almost absent in classical studies on metacognition, 
is awareness. It creates links between the first two dimensions (Formenti, 2010, 
p. 81). Writing a metacognitive report concerning the processes involved in a 
given learning process, keeping track of the flowing thoughts, ideas, emotional 
resonances, personal values emerging during the exercise and the discussion in 
classroom (ibidem), implies the exercise of a reflexivity on the functioning of 
one’s own mind, a practice that can be encouraged even in future users.
However, taking into account the link between critical thinking/writing, 
metacognition provides an incomplete picture of the processes involved in 
self-regulation. It foresees that perception and motivation are integral parts of 
the learning process: the sense of self-efficacy plays a decisive role in learning 
processes (Schunk, 1995; Zimmerman, 2000). Moreover, comparing one’s own 
relationships and the intuitions contained by them with the literature and the 
productions made by previous years students shows a useful tool to reinforce 
what has been acquired during the experience, with an impact on the internal 
locus of control.
Learning involves the integration of new information within the existing 
knowledge. Providing explanations to oneself (self-explaining ability) facilitates 
that process of integration. Until now, it has been shown that self-explanation 
improves the acquisition of problem-solving skills when studying through elab-
orate examples. Some studies show that self-explanation can also be facilitative 
when it is explicitly promoted, in the context of learning a declarative knowl-
edge, from an expository text (Michelene, De Leeuw, Mei-Hung & LaVancher, 
1994, p. 439).
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Learning processes are often considered in terms of both understanding and 
acquisition of skills. Concerning comprehension, the declarative information to 
be understood (like a story) creates a map of knowledge that is already stored 
and organized in memory; comprehension updates the existing knowledge.
While learning a procedural competence, two classes of mechanisms are 
proposed: the acquisition of knowledge and the compilation. In the acquisition 
of knowledge, an initial version of a competence (such as the set of instructions 
on how to send an email) is directly encoded by the source of the instruction. 
In compiling knowledge, codified competence is slowly transformed so that it 
becomes more efficient.
In any case, new instructions of both declarative and procedural knowledge 
cannot always be present or directly codified; they often require the integration 
of new information with the existing knowledge. This process of integration 
can be facilitated by asking students to actively build what they are learning 
(Michelene, DeLeeuw, Mei-Hung & LaVancher, 1994, p. 440).
Self-explaining (ibidem) is a special form of construction activity that has 
been shown to be effective in improving the acquisition of problem-solving 
skills. Apparently, self-explanations that arise spontaneously, as well as when 
studying examples elaborated by a text, are processes that promote the acquisi-
tion of competences, although they do not require direct coding of the instruc-
tion or the compilation of a codified competence.
Research has shown that this is not the case. There is a general movement in 
scientific literature on education through speaking, reflecting, explicating and 
explaining as learning strategies, especially for contextualizing scientific do-
mains. The main idea of the new “scientific dialogic approach” is that students 
should learn to be able to talk about the elaborated knowledge (understanding 
how the field’s speech is organized, how the topics are presented, and what 
counts as argumentation and as a support for these arguments), so that they can 
participate in scientific discussions rather than simply listen to science-related 
information (ivi, p. 441).
The dialogic approach is part of the general capacity for self-explanation, 
the effects of which extend from the acquisition of skills to the learning of a 
new coherent knowledge.
The ability to self-explain promotes a deeper understanding of the expressed 
materials, as shown by the capacity of explaining to answer more complex 
issues. The more that students are able to provide explanations of their own 
mental processes, the deeper their understanding will be. Learning is the use of 
pre-existing knowledge combined with new information to create new knowl-
edge. In some ways, self-explanation is “the thought of what one knows” (ivi, 
p. 470). Learning the ability to self-explain can be mediated through the follow-
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ing three processing characteristics, each of which can shed light on why it is a 
particularly effective learning activity.
First, self-explaining implies that new declarative or procedural knowledge 
has to be constructed. In fact, self-explaining is a form of constructive activity 
that leads to questioning whether other forms of non-verbal constructive ac-
tivity are equally effective in promoting learning. To assess this issue, studies 
have been carried out to understand self-observation activity through diagrams 
drawing. Somehow, we have seen that the learning processes were facilitated.
The self-explaining process contains a second important feature: it encour-
ages the integration of recently learned materials with existing knowledge.
Finally, strictly connected to the previous characteristic, the third process-
ing characteristic has direct implications for a constructive activity that can be 
sort of effective in promoting learning, which involves the integration of new 
with old knowledge. It is better to carry out this integration in a continuous way.
A potential way to create a moment to share stems from theories of per-
ceptual learning that emphasize cross-domain differentiation (Schwartz & 
Bransford, 1998, p. 479). Within the framework of constructivist theories, it has 
been hypothesized that learning through action implies some form of manipula-
tion or external activity. Furthermore, another idea has also been developed that 
the best learning occurs when individuals put their efforts and attention togeth-
er to approach their ideas with meaningful connections.
This “assembly of knowledge” perspective (ivi, p. 492) is reflected in the 
theories of elaboration that describe learning as a process of connecting ideas. 
In terms of elaboration, the comparison of one’s own experience with that of the 
others has encouraged students to assemble relationships that connected infor-
mation with previous knowledge. This processing has increased the number of 
possible multiple links and connections to the target concepts by implementing 
the ability to recover relevant concepts and powering predictive capabilities.
In brief, there is an emerging significance of learning: learning as a discov-
ery, according to which individuals effectively learn when they have genera-
tively focused on figures and structures that differentiate relevant aspects of 
experience.
Deep understanding requires both a structure of differentiated knowledge, 
which develops when evaluating alternatives between different cases, and a 
structure of explanatory knowledge, such as that often deriving from a story 
and narration. These ideas can be useful to think about structuring generative 
learning activities that can include the elaboration aimed at assembling knowl-
edge and open production aimed at learning through praxic action.
The results of a similar kind of experience are more formative, since its 
evaluation is “enactive”. It is based on experience and personal judgement and 
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not on the evaluation of an external observer (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 88). Addi-
tionally, in this case, the function that the student attributes to his writing skills 
plays an important role.
As for metacognition, for self-efficacy, it is possible to identify three dis-
tinct phases: foresight and planning, during which students analyse the learn-
ing task and set specific goals; performance monitoring, in which strategies are 
used to facilitate progress and monitor task effectiveness; and reflections on the 
performance, or the evaluation of the chosen strategies’ efficacy.
Self-regulation involves orienting thoughts, feelings, and self-generat-
ed behaviours towards the achievement of goals (Zimmerman, 2002, p. 65). 
Self-regulation processes are structured in three cyclical phases. The “previ-
sion” phase comprises the processes and beliefs that occur before attempting to 
learn; the “performance” phase comprises the processes that occur during the 
improvement in terms of behaviour. In conclusion, self-reflection occurs after 
each learning attempt. The “prevision” phase includes two categories of main 
processes: task analysis and self-assessment.
The “performance” phase includes two categories of main processes: 
self-control and self-observation. Instead, the self-regulation phase includes the 
capacity for self-judgement and self-evaluation and the ability to implement 
adaptive/defensive responses, defined as self-reaction skills (ivi, p. 68).
Self-regulation involves personal initiatives, perseverance and acquired 
skills (ivi, p. 70) instead of socially isolated methods of learning. Self-regula-
tion processes can be taught and lead to improvements in motivation and goals 
achieved by the students (ivi, p. 69).
Once again, the connection with writing emerges. Zimmerman and Bandura 
(1994) conducted a study concerning the role of opinions on self-efficacy in 
academic achievement and writing standards with university freshmen by us-
ing comparative analyses. These self-regulating variables were measured at the 
beginning of the writing course and were related to the degrees of the final 
course. The verbal school attitudes of the students and the level of education 
were included in the analysis. The perception of one’s writing skills has influ-
enced both the perceived self-efficacy in the academic setting and the personal 
quality standards that oneself considered satisfying (Zimmerman & Bandura, 
1994, p. 845).
The perception of self-efficacy in the academic environment has influenced 
the achievement of a level of writing both directly and through its impact on the 
definition of personal goals. These paths of influence are interpreted in terms of 
a socio-cognitive theory of self-regulation in the academic sphere.
Therefore, it has been shown that writing and verbal self-orientation strat-
egies increase the perceived self-efficacy and improve the schematic structure 
STROLLO.indd   71 28/05/19   15:21
Copyright © 2018 by FrancoAngeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy.  ISBN 9788891793997 
72
and the quality of the compositions (ivi, p. 846). Students are more confident 
of their ability to structure and communicate ideas and to overcome competing 
impediments. They also have more reason to believe in their ability to achieve 
academic success. Moreover, as demonstrated in this and other studies, it is one 
thing is to have self-regulation skills to learn in the academic field; it is another 
thing is to be able to adhere to those skills when other activities arouse more 
interest.
The students register their weakest sense of effectiveness to stick to aca-
demic activities, as there are other interesting things to do (ivi, p. 858). There-
fore, in promoting self-directive learning, students need not only to be encour-
aged to build skills and strategies for managing cognitive aspects but also to be 
motivated by building a bridge between formal and informal training (Strollo, 
2008). This aspect of the support of metacognition and self-regulation for indi-
vidual learning tasks implies the reinforcement of cognitive strategies that can 
be transferred to other contexts and presents the dual objective of forming uni-
versity students and making sure that they will learn by using similar character-
istics in the future (Zumbrunn, Tadlock & Roberts, 2011, p. 15).
STROLLO.indd   72 28/05/19   15:21
Copyright © 2018 by FrancoAngeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy.  ISBN 9788891793997 
73
Epistemology of education laboratories follows a different path from the most 
commonly used strategies, as they do not start from the analysis of the biograph-
ical experience but from a preliminary systematization of knowledge, which 
one acquired around the educational process through a synchronic-comparative 
analysis of the formation models. This analysis is preliminary to the choice and 
explication of a model of action. This explication takes place through the con-
struction of the hypertext.
As we will see from the pilot and the second study analysis, the three di-
mensions of intentionality in a neurophenomenological key are taken up and 
metacognitively processed through the construction of the hypertext and the 
compilation of a metacognitive grid.
A prerequisite is given from knowing the current debate about the forma-
tion process theories. When we face the objects of the cultural world “as a the-
ory, our first task is to understand it. However, understanding a theory does not 
mean accepting it. Nor it means that we must consider said theory as the best 
among the competing ones. In fact, before being able to form a judgement on 
the preferability of a certain theory on some others, we must first understand 
them all” (Popper, 1994).
Therefore, applying the comparative approach to formation models will 
be considered a preliminary moment to the activation of self-reflection strat-
egies and then to examine the hypertext construction method as a moment of 
reconstruction-explication of the cultural path underlying the implicit and indi-
vidual modelling process. The path is aimed at the acquisition of self-reflection 
strategies as a preliminary moment to an “autonomous and responsible ac-
tion” that turns out from conscious and critical future choices, based on the 
understanding, control and management of the greatest number of possible 
alternatives.
2. The multimedia laboratory of educational 
epistemology
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In this context, the comparative approach is presented as a “complex path” 
aimed at acquiring strategies that allow critically review and falsify, if neces-
sary, the theoretical models of reference. If the complexity of real presents it-
self with the features “of jumble, of the inextricable, of disorder, ambiguity, 
uncertainty”, the choice of a point of view, of a model requires “to put order in 
the phenomena by rejecting the disorder, to remove the uncertain”, “to select 
the elements of order and certainty, to purify from ambiguity, to clarify, distin-
guish and hierarchize” not by falling into simplifications and reductionism, but 
by maintaining the characteristics of the complexus. The hypothesized path is 
divided into two phases.
The first phase concerns the main pedagogical models of formation analy-
sis’, highlighting their historical roots and placing them in the contemporary 
context. The second phase, comprising a laboratory, is characterized by three 
stages (1. plurality of points of view = plurality of reference models = disor-
der (subjective); 2. comparison = order (subjective); and 3. choice = ability to 
manage disorder = subjective knowledge = temporary subjective model) and is 
aimed at the explicit choice of a model and at the reconstruction of the cultur-
al and experiential path – formal, non-formal and informal – from which the 
choice emerged, meant, in any case, as a provisional choice and open to new 
reviews based on future experiences.
In the first phase, through different lectures, the main interpreting models of 
the formative process are analysed to underline the contrasting characteristics 
and the common difficult core. The literature contains plenty of models that are 
analysed during the lessons, starting from the role assumed by the trainer and 
the subject in formation within the educational relationship. This choice makes 
possible a greater schematization of the models, which are distinguished in 
models of autonomy, models of heteronomy and eco-systemic models (Strollo, 
2008)
Furthermore, during the taught classes, the main identified models are illus-
trated, starting from the “implicit pedagogies” that underlie the communication 
actions undertaken at the “naive” level by individuals.
The second phase of the comparative path foresees a laboratory time during 
which, once the reference model has been identified after a comparison, the stu-
dent reconstructs the cultural path from which he made the choice, considering 
that it was oriented not only by one’s daily life story (first level) but also by the 
selection of cultural inputs received during the formal formation (second level).
The path of reconstruction, far from being linear, will refer not only to the 
events of everyday life but also to those texts encountered during the studies 
that seem to offer, from the operational point of view, suggestions consistent 
with the chosen model.
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Hypertext explains the multiple paths that allow one to reconstruct one’s 
own process of constructing a formation model while maintaining the inevita-
ble links between the contributions offered by formal (institutional formation), 
non-formal (a formation related to the belonging society) and informal (forma-
tion connected to personal experiences) paths.
The construction of the hypertext makes a reticular model emerge. Within 
the latter, one can identify nodes referring to formal, informal and non-formal 
formation. The goal is to “objectify the consciousness” as a first moment to 
emancipate it from the constraints that guide it in action, through the cognitive 
bilocation that allows one to be oneself and other from oneself in the contem-
poraneity offered by being able to, at the same time, self define. The unity of 
consciousness is, in fact, always the result of a recursive ring.
Edgar Morin (2001) claims that consciousness is subjective. However, it 
splits so that the subject can objectively consider his own thought, actions and 
person. Consciousness expresses the human being’s strong need for objectivity. 
Furthermore, consciousness is the peak of subjectivity and objectivity. The re-
cursive circle that generates consciousness produces, according to the subject’s 
attention, consciousness of the self, of the objects that one knows, of one’s own 
knowledge, of the thought and, in brief, of having a consciousness.
This recursive circle constitutes a metalevel that allows meta-reflective 
though, which is able to act back on the thought itself. That metalevel establish-
es, at the same time, the bond and the detachment of the self from itself, of the 
self, compared to the ideas and thoughts. The metalevel establishes a primary 
condition of the critical examination of every idea and thought. It also exceeds 
and encompasses cognitive activities while being part of it. Consciousness dou-
bled in consciousness of consciousness and can thus be considered a meta point 
of view while remaining itself (ibidem).
Actually, we are addressing dynamics that underlie the learning process-
es in formal contexts and how these processes are part of the general learn-
ing process that covers a set of multiple and complex, multi-distributed and 
multi-placed functions. Learning moves multiple levels of mental organization, 
which must be rigorously included in the organization of practical formative 
models. If formative processes have to be ‘intentioned’ on the basis of auton-
omy as a meta-competence, and if formative intentionality requires to prepare 
settings by meaning the environment as a complex context, consisting of both 
natural-biological and artificial-technological factors, then the settings will 
have to be organized to favour one’s awareness of individuality. Hence, there is 
a need to consider the experiential and learning dimension for an individual as 
multidimensional, multi-medial and multifactorial. Furthermore, we will have 
to consider the need to identify the environments and the tools that constitute 
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the appropriate settings to these assumptions, followed by the multi-medial, 
synesthetic and multifactorial dimensions.
Hypertext and the links between its three sections allow the student to un-
derstand that the origin of his modelling processes is not composed of a linear 
process, ranging from informal to formal. In contrast, it is made of circular pro-
cesses that develop a relationship of mutual regulation starting from the formal 
and informal inputs. Therefore, hypertext escapes from a rigidly linear and se-
quential logic, which is peculiar to the traditional written narrative text. Hence, 
it allows us to highlight the network of interconnections that underlie the pro-
cesses of action modelling.
Therefore, a self-formative process is realized, which implies a double 
appropriation of the power of formation; it means holding this power – be-
coming subjects – but also applying it to oneself: becoming an object of for-
mation for oneself. This double operation splits the individual into a subject 
and into a peculiar object that can be called self-referential. This split broad-
ens, oxygenates and increases the capacity for autonomy in that intersection, 
interval, interface between hetero- and eco-training that is, at the beginning, 
the individual.
In this model, three levels have been included, which were identified from 
the neurophenomenological literature: enactment, emergence, intersubjectivity.
As for the principle of enactment, it was necessary to identify a basic hy-
pertext structure that allowed us to explicit and metacognitively understand the 
network that underlies the mental processes. Additionally, it had to be visually 
reproduced, perceptually experienced, simulating its construction through the 
links between formal, non-formal and informal knowledge that implicitly guide 
the processes of modelling of educational action.
The visual approach, that is, the retinal message that makes its way into 
the inner consciousness, is organically included between two structured dimen-
sions: the immediate global perception of the hypertext’s structure in its entire-
ty and the detailed analytical perception of the information of the single parts 
(Pic. 1-2).
We used a program called FrontPage that allows users, during the hypertext 
construction process, to visualize the basic structure and to monitor the connec-
tions between the individual parts generated both by the navigable structure, 
starting from the “navigation bars”, and from the links intentionally inserted 
by the students.
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FORMAL:
The Authors and books 
that mostly contributed 
to my formation…
(pedagogy, science, 
philosophy, literature, 
psychology…)
NON FORMAL:
My idea of formation is 
expressed in...
INTRODUCTION
INFORMAL:
Those experiences 
that marked my way 
of meaning formation 
are… 
Books 1st experienceThis/These book/s… 2
nd experience
Art
The event
This/These 
song/s…
The event
Authors
The context
This/These 
film/s…
The context
Poetry The main 
characters: Me 
and the others
This/These 
work/s of art…
The main 
characters: Me 
and the others
Others That time I learned that…
This poetry 
and…
That time I 
learned that…
Pic. 2 – Example of basic hypertext structure: the first two levels are common to all the 
students. The subsequent levels are built independently.
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Writing guidelines to hypertext’s introduction/conclusion*
Myself and the hypertext
While building the hypertext, I have followed these steps, first I have… Because…
The thread that holds together and crosses all my knowledge (how I connected my 
knowledge) …
During the realization of the hypertext it happened that…
The construction of hypertext for me was an experience…
The most emotional moments were…
I believe that hypertext is a type of task…
Requires ability to…
If I had to redo this experience, I would change…
I would recommend to a colleague of mine…
2.1. The pilot study
The sample of the pilot study consists of 100 students enrolled in the bach-
elor’s degree in Psychological Sciences and Techniques, selected among those 
who were attending the Psychology of Learning course (Academic Year 2013 
to 2014)
The study allowed us to collect 120 introductions to the hypertext, based on 
the metacognitive grid.
Both empirical scientists and experimental subjects are be trained in the 
phenomenological method. Varela, hypothesizes that such training should in-
clude the learning of the practice of the epoché and phenomenological reduc-
tion, that is, the subject should learn to put aside, or “in parentheses”, opinions 
and theories about the experience and consciousness that one could possess, to 
concentrate, instead, on the way things are experienced (Gallagher & Zahavi, 
2012).
In this regard, the laboratory organizes specific mindfulness courses, for an 
analysis of which please refer to De Simone, Romano & Strollo (2014) and De 
Simone & Strollo (2014).
From the phenomenological analysis conducted by three judges it emerged 
that in analogy to what has been described about the emergence feature, the 
hypertextual model also has the characteristic of a transitory configuration, in-
ternalized by the student who recognizes the incompleteness of his work and 
the link between its single elements: the displacement, the insertion or elimi-
nation of a single element involves a deep revision of one’s work. The retic-
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ular dynamics of the hypertextual construction process acts as a model of the 
analogous dynamics underlying the processes of action modeling: it derives the 
awareness that an explicit element, arising within the “system” of the explicit 
knowledge, significantly changes the sense of all the other subsystems giving 
life to a new configuration (RE1).
Report of the experience 1 (RE1)
The first version of my hypertext was completely different, but now there is 
no trace of the original work. In fact, this has been a long and tortuous work of 
meditation, of rethinking that has allowed me to discover ever new things about 
my inner world.
It was a gruelling job that completely absorbed me, every now and then 
emerged a thought or a memory that I pursued, connected and often abandoned; 
but nothing was useless, I discovered in myself thoughts, feelings, motivations 
that I didn’t know I had. I don’t know how this experience has changed me be-
cause there is still so much activity in my mind, but I can certainly say that I 
come back to the world a little more conscious. Following several revisions, I 
realize that I cannot absolutely say that this is the final version, because my path 
of growth and exploration of my theory of the formative process is not to be con-
sidered complete yet. [BDI/00219]
Why Work in Progress? Firstly because, for a very long time, my work 
seemed like a construction site, with the only difference that besides not know-
ing when the aforementioned works would come to an end, I also ignored what 
would have been seen in the end. It seemed to me to place some pieces, brick by 
brick, but without knowing where the road I was building, would have led; and 
at the end, ironically, although the product was finished, that Work in Progress 
continued to seem to me the most fitting title, this time not so much to describe 
the work itself, but as an indication of the deeper meaning it has for me. Work 
in progress is well suited to a personality in progress, with a meaning, however, 
tending to negative as well as positive: or, rather than optimistically focus on 
the quality of dynamism, progression forward, planning, I highlighted the as-
pects of complexity and contradiction that necessarily, in my opinion, accompa-
ny a “work in progress” state. [BDI/00206]
It is always difficult to find the words for a conclusion, especially in this 
case, in which I have the impression of having just started. Through the hyper-
text I was able to retrace my formative path and discover the common thread. 
I found it quite difficult because I had no idea of the topics to choose, I did not 
make any mental scheme, I chose the topics that I liked the most without any 
causal or established link. Then when I made the various connections it was 
surprising because I was afraid that I would not find them, that I could not find 
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a common element, but then they came by themselves. It was nice because may-
be, I already had my own mental scheme but it was implicit, and I discovered it 
through this hypertext. [BDI/00216]
At the beginning, I didn’t believe this job was necessary, I considered it an 
overload, but then… day after day I found myself re-gleaning those books that 
have meant a lot to me, those songs and poems, those paintings that marked my 
adolescence. Reliving them helped me to grow. And so, the more days went by 
the more I thought about things that I had before, perhaps, indeed, certainly, I 
had never thought so deeply. [BDI/00209]
While constructing this hypertext, I had to deal with the need to rethink the 
directions taken so far from my formative path and, at the same time, to meta-
models, theoretical and methodological models that have influenced my think-
ing, each referring to a precise way of understanding man, life, change. Through 
the exercise of questioning and systematization necessary for the purposes of 
structuring the hypertext, I could see the presence of unexpected cross-cutting 
between the three levels - formal, non-formal, informal - and at the same time 
a close interdependence between the same elements of every level, of which I 
wasn’t fully aware [BDI/00183].
Moreover, hypertext constitutes a new form of communication with one’s 
own self that, as objectifying thought, allows one to experience the dynamism 
of one’s knowledge graphically represented by the three intertwined dimen-
sions of formal, non-formal and informal.
It becomes a perturbing learning environment able to generate an expansion 
of perceptive consciousness, an increase in sensitivity that can be defined in 
terms of autopoiesis (RE2), that is, capable of enhancing the “directional sense 
of acting”, ie “self-ability of making decisions regardless of expectations, as-
sessments or conditions imposed by society” (Mezirow, 1991).
The connection to the experience and the link to the theory that is in the hy-
pertext section in which the theoretical model is reported, allows us to bring 
out the circular nexus between experience/theory/action: “Au départ, faire ré-
férence à l’action c’était d’abord rendre intelligible une conduite en décrivant 
les étapes par lequel le sujet était passé pour produire le résultat auquel il avait 
abouti. Sans la connaissance du déroulement de ces étapes, les activités cogni-
tives étaient incompréhensibles, les analyses d’erreurs ou la mise en évidence 
de processus vicariants et de la diversité des procédés cognitifs mobilisables 
impossibles. Mais cette référence à l’action permettait aussi d’éviter d’oublier 
le rapport que l’on doit toujours pouvoir établir entre le discours et les actes” 
(Vermersch, 2007).
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It is therefore expected that “the stabilization of the phenomenal categories 
through first-person methods will be associated with specific changes in long-
term or short-term brain activity” (ibidem). It is therefore a matter of translat-
ing the “background knowledge” into knowledge under investigation, which 
includes everything that is uncritically taken for granted in the analysis of a 
problem.
Creating links between formal, non-formal and informal knowledge, the 
subject’s experience is refined in its descriptive quality so that “by increasing 
his competence, the subject contributes to stabilizing his experience, he ac-
quires this ability by making a firm grip on the different facets and on the se-
quencing of his experience, as well as establishing greater rigor in his analysis; 
he pays more attention to the variability of internal, inter- and intra-individual 
states, which are now no longer considered as a kind of background noise but 
as a constitutive component of his experience” (Depratz, 2006).
RE2
Until now I have received so many theoretical notions about education, but 
I have never questioned myself about my formative process and above all I have 
never realized that there was a meaning behind remembering some authors in-
stead of others. The writing of this hypertext has seen me literally projected in 
my library. I spent hours leafing through books, those of my personal readings, 
those of high school and university […] I selected authors, topics, quotes; then I 
looked for songs and movies and, in the end, I evaluated everything that I iden-
tified. I looked for a hypothetical common thread, and once I found it, I tried to 
connect it to myself and to my process of change. This elaborate has to be un-
derstood as a great discovery of a feeling that has become now deeply aware 
and the recognition that these same emotions can, sometimes, represent a per-
sonal limit [BDI/00155]
The proposal of the hypertextual work, resounds in me with a strong “di-
vergent” charge, moving the memory circuits and inviting me to tell myself, to 
re-read the experience in a critical key. I felt the double dimension of remaining 
“inside” the formative path and, nevertheless, to find, in the metacognitive re-
flection, the interpretative coordinates that give me back a horizon of meaning, 
which projects me towards the future. [BDI/00152]
A confusing state is the one that characterizes the current state of my educa-
tion, which hasn’t reached yet the point where the multiple information selected 
over time is organized by coherent “actions” aimed at adopting different tools 
for each objective to be achieved, specific for each context. Nevertheless, trends 
emerge, themes, whose awareness I owe to this experience, whose meaning must 
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be sought not a priori but now, that everything ends, everything starts! The 
search for meaning begins, the desire to respond to multiple question marks.
The most extraordinary thing about the work on myself, about my process 
of self-reflection on what I am now, and what has helped me to be what I am to-
day, is rediscovering myself as part of an immense world of thoughts, emotions, 
experiences…
There will never simply be an epilogue to this process of knowledge, because 
there is never an end to oneself knowledge. It is a continuous sailing between 
living and non-lived worlds…
This hypertext is part of my present, but for sure it will continue to “be 
there”, with all its significance even in my tomorrow.
Below we have the full version of the introduction of a hypertext built with 
a double structure. The first, corresponds to the basic structure common to all 
students, the second, was built by the student after completing the first draft.
Before we face this hypertext topics, I want to underline the processuality 
of this work and the fact that it is the product of a journey, rather than the re-
alization of a predefined project. The themes, the citations, the works included 
in this hypertext didn’t have an apparent link, nor an explicit meaning until the 
end; only at the end of the work have they been combined, interrelated, inter-
twined with each other, finally revealing their sense, their sense of being to-
gether. In the three different sections of hypertext I inserted the lines, the notes, 
the images and the rhymes that, in immediate way, I gathered in my attempt to 
remember. In doing this, I can say that I have gone through two distinct phas-
es: at first, I experienced a state of confusion regarding the objectives of this 
work and the modalities required for its realization; I was especially worried 
about obtaining clear guidelines on WHAT and HOW; in a second moment I 
realized that my need for clarity, (which was manifested, above all, in the ten-
dency to immediately establish a title and a theme common to the three sec-
tions) in reality, was more an attempt to “reassure me”, within the definition of 
limits and guidelines, compared to a condition of SUSPENSION of the search 
for meaning.
What emerged from the overall reading of the contents included in the hy-
pertext, is that they can be divided in two groups: those I remember, but which 
today I feel very far from me, and those in which, instead, I completely find 
myself.
This division, highlights that in my formative course we can draw a line of 
demarcation between a before and after and that this line represents an experi-
ence that I know very well to be very significant; therefore, the contents that I 
feel extraneous to my way of being and thinking are those that refer to the period 
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before the occurrence of the aforementioned experience, while those that I feel 
closest to me refer to the period following it. Reflecting on these differences I had 
the impression that what makes these elements so different and what determines 
their insertion into one group rather than another, lies in the fact that some show 
obvious attention to form and others to content: they reveal a different way of 
dealing with concepts, one that is more superficial and the other more reflective. 
Moreover, among those of the second group, some have clear references to my 
experience. Reflecting on this contrast between form and content, I understood 
that, in fact, it is nothing more than the result of a transposition in the theoretical 
field of what I practically felt, through my experience: a transition from appear-
ing to being. And if now I think back to the difficulties, I initially encountered 
in approaching this work, it seems clear to me that they should be read in this 
light, as an evolution from an initial concern for form to a subsequent attention 
to content. I think that from all this clearly emerges the presence of a circularity 
between theory and praxis: the possibility that an event can bring about a change 
that changes the way you relate to a text, and the possibility that reading a book 
can inducing, accompanying, conditioning the way in which we relate to others, 
to ourselves and to life. I believe that circularity is the essence of this work: if I 
had to graphically represent it, I would give it the shape of a sphere in which the 
beginning and the end meet and almost do not distinguish, a circumference in 
which the individual points disappear and merge. Ultimately, I am very satisfied 
with this work, because it has allowed me to get involved, to be in a critical way 
compared to some fundamental changes that have influenced my training. It was 
a moment of reflection that made me more aware. It was a formative moment be-
cause to reflect on one’s own formation, in my opinion it is, in itself, formative.
Among the various situations in which I was formed, I decided to report the 
experience of this work, as it can be considered an effective example of how 
change is the product of an autonomous operation that leads us to choose be-
tween the various contents of the culture that best suits our way of being and 
seeing things. In fact, I had the opportunity to freely choose in my training the 
things that I think most marked me and this led me to reflect on it and acquire an 
awareness that I did not previously have. It is as if a new conception of change 
had been created in me, starting from that not very articulated and somewhat 
vague idea I had before.
During the development of the hypertext, I was surprised by the chosen au-
thors, with a clear mind, I thought I had forgotten, but I realized that many of 
the knowledge learned in the past is in me in a latent state and silently affects 
the way of knowing and interpreting reality.
The construction of this kind of hypertext is a highly personalized task. Per-
haps who doesn’t have the ability for self-analysis, closing in, or who is a bit su-
perficial, who has no capacity for synthesis and a recursive and reconstructive 
thought will have considered this task trivial or extremely difficult. I had my ini-
tial difficulties, because a new task had to be completed. But who wouldn’t have 
had them? Then, it was nice and fun. I don’t know what strategies my colleagues 
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It emerges from many reports that reflecting critically on the distorted prem-
ises, which support the structure of expectations compared to the educational 
relationship, transforms the perspective of meaning. The task is perceived as 
a “disorienting dilemma”, a perturbing input, as Varela says, (RE3). Starting 
from this, a critical evaluation of the epistemological, socio-cultural or psychic 
assumptions is made together with the consequent implementation of knowl-
edge and skills, useful to construct future action plans.
RE3
First, I think it is necessary to express my initial difficulty in achieving all 
this. I confess that the meeting with a colleague who showed us his hypertext was 
decisive. Until then I had only seen so many “special effects” and I used to worry 
about not being able to use them, not being very good with the computer. I lis-
tened to the previous explanations, but only then I understood the sentence of the 
teacher: “You only have to do what we are talking about”. Until then that “the-
ory-praxis-theory”, “the explication of one’s own implicit model of training”, 
seemed to me only concepts to be learned to pass the exam, repeated a thousand 
times in previous pedagogy courses. I wanted at all costs to understand the theme 
to be performed, but I could not find it and I was wondering: “Do I have to talk 
about my ideal model of formation?”. And so, only after that fateful meeting, my 
hypertext has acquired a sense and from the idea of  a useless essay from the ex-
amination of maturity, it has become the means to reflect. Perhaps this is the rea-
son why I refused, at the beginning, to understand what I was asked to do: I was 
just afraid to get involved. And so, I wanted to try at all costs a theme to play, a 
lifeline to cling to, as I always tried to do, but then when I started, everything be-
came simpler, more natural and more interesting than any other thesis to write. I 
stood in front of my bookstore and took all those books and authors that had been 
meaningful to me and that had accompanied me in their growth. So, I started to 
reflect, abandoning any desire for consistency, without a purpose, a well-defined 
goal to be reached, without books or authors to study. There were so many au-
thors, movies and songs that I wanted to insert, but only some of them were so 
significant, to leave, even after a long time, an unmistakable sign. In fact, these 
are the things that made me as I am. I inserted everything in the different sections 
adopted to solve it, but one thing I would recommend doing, if they find my same 
difficulties, is to take a moment from the hectic everyday life, relax, take a pen 
and start writing anything runs through their mind, to break the ice with your-
self and start talking with your theories. Everything else will come by itself. If 
they were giving me the opportunity to rewrite this hypertext, now, I would not 
change anything, but maybe in a few months the things I would insert would be 
different [BDI/00251]
STROLLO.indd   85 28/05/19   15:21
Copyright © 2018 by FrancoAngeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy.  ISBN 9788891793997 
86
starting from the formal and only when I finished writing in the informal section, 
I found that red string that united those authors. At the beginning, in fact, some 
seemed opposed and irreconcilable, but later I understood. Through their words 
I found two recurrent elements: on the one hand the fear of the others, a fear that 
does not allow you to express yourself, to live, to get involved, which pushes you 
to seek the perfection and approval of others, who makes you hide behind a mask, 
which makes your life useless, of an endless boredom, that does not allow you to 
accept your limits, and on the other the desire to be and to realize yourself with-
out any fear, to fully live, so I won’t have to regret anything… and thinking about 
it my path, until now, it has been nothing but a continuous oscillation between 
these two shores. [BDI/00208]
2.2. The second study
The sample of the second study consists of 60 students enrolled in the mas-
ter’s degree in Psychology and 140 students enrolled in the bachelor’s degree 
in Psychological Sciences and Techniques. The sample of the master’s degree 
students was selected among the attendants of the Social Pedagogy course 
(Academic Year 2014 to 2015), while the sample of the three-year Degree stu-
dents was selected among those who were attending the Psychology of Learning 
course (Academic Year 2014 to 2015)
It was a transversal study that allowed us to collect over 120 introduc-
tions to the hypertext, based on the metacognitive grid, and 80 metacognitive 
questionnaires.
The goals of the formative intervention are:
• Experimenting the experience of building the hypertext as a device for ret-
rospection, self-reflection and self-formation.
• Catching its elements of self-reflection and meta-cognition through the 
experience.
• Experimenting the role of the educational intentionality on the cognitive 
processes and the association between intentionality/formation/experiences 
in particular.
The making of the hypertext is part of the activities that take place in the 
Laboratory of Epistemology and Practices of Education (www.lepe.unina.it). 
During said activities, through specific and graduated exercises, the students 
had experienced and analyzed the construction of experiential paths for a listen-
ing education. The Laboratory’s goal was to achieve learning through listening 
to oneself (via the hypertext and a work focused on Mindfulness), the others 
(through Music Therapy) and the social context (through a workshop based on 
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the techniques of the Theatre of the Oppressed). The planning of the educa-
tional activities was discussed and re-thought in order to promote a complex, 
integrated and multifunctional course of Listening Education. Every kind of 
educational activity aims to promote a critical, dialogic and reflective thinking 
in the participants, who are the active protagonists of the educational proposals. 
From time to time, the developed educational practices combine in a moment of 
shared and co-constructed dialogic reflection and questioning in which practice 
rejoins theory in their interdependence and interconnection.
2.3. Results of the metacognitive grids
The research on the intentionality from an educative perspective went to-
gether with the production of introductory reports developed from the metacog-
nitive grids accomplished after the first phase of this research. These reports are 
narrative and meta-narrative tools. The textual content of the reports written by 
the participants has been analyzed by T-Lab, a software for data management 
and text analysis. We have proceeded on a first phase that included the coding 
and the “cleaning” of the collected textual material: the 120 introductions had 
been drawn up with the help of the metacognitive grid in order to ease the de-
coding and the analysis of such content. We have proceeded then with an anal-
ysis of the textual occurrences in order to identify the terms and the “dense” 
words by calculating their frequency and repetition in the text. The analysis of 
the occurrences works as a first filter for the information within the text: it al-
lows to recognize the most used meaningful, common and shared words. This 
kind of textual analysis is the result of a lemmatization process that led to a 
vocabulary of key-words, used during the analysis of associations and co-oc-
currences. The vocabulary has then been further screened and verified by the 
research group in order to filter only the most relevant words for the analysis. 
The research group adopted a comparative and linking methodology for the re-
cursive selection of the words composing the analysis’ vocabulary, the subse-
quent analyses and the interpretation of the results. In particular, it was decid-
ed to adopt a panel of three independent judges who independently discussed 
and elaborated the analysis of textual data. Then, the results were compared 
to each other and checked. Referring to the scientific literature, they were dis-
cussed and reviewed with the entire multidisciplinary research group. It was 
then decided to adopt a panel of three independent judges who had discussed 
and elaborated the analysis of the textual data independently. The results were 
then compared to each other, re-checked in view of the referential scientific lit-
erature and discussed within the entire multidisciplinary research group.
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2.4. Lemmatization and analyzed vocabulary
Key-words n.
hypertext 180
experience 116
formal 101
path 70
knowledges 63
own 61
to think 56
to listen 56
formation 50
different 50
allow 49
song 49
moment 44
create 42
informal 42
riflection 41
to build 40
life 39
change 38
work 37
construction 37
group 36
link 33
to represent 32
knowledge 32
new 32
laboratory 31
to link 31
to reflect 31
to rend 29
thinking 29
first 29
choice 29
to put 28
to succeed 28
to try 27
to change 27
book  27
emotions 27
contents 26
to ask 26
shape 26
Film 26
concept 26
to choose 26
own  26
oppression 25
sentence 25
To find 25
personal 25
idea 24
dimension 24
learning 23
realization 23
to happen 23
sense 22
listening 22
insert 22
author 22
formative 22
to keep 21
to leave 21
to identify 21
possibility 21
to see 21
to understand 21
task 21
to suggest 21
to emerge 21
elements 20
to believe 20
colleague 20
words 20
memories 20
connection  20
research 19
reality 19
level 19
to teach 19
to talk 19
passage 19
time 19
capability 18
lived 18
hypertextual 18
to listen 18
awareness 18
process 18
simple 18
student 18
oppressed 18
metaphor 18
to re-do 18
professor 18
to select 18
meaningful 17
material 17
to start 17
to connect 17
to remember 17
to follow 17
tied 16
to write 16
emotional 16
to recover 16
to assimilate 16
relation 16
difficulty 16
conflict 15
to reclaim 15
different 15
The textual analysis is a recursive process in which a reference and a return 
to the original text subsist in ta theory-praxis-theory circularity: this allows the 
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selection of lemma originating from the text, although it’s not a truly exhaustive 
process. Even when a first selection of the textual units and the key-lemmas to 
work on has to be made, it’s necessary to look again at the text to check the links 
between the emerging words and the already identified thematic clusters, whose 
meanings refer to the already produced introductions. The text has been then 
fragmented in significant textual units in order to evaluate all the co-occurrences 
taking place among them. It goes without saying that the text has been further 
refined at every stage of the analysis in order to improve the key-words vocab-
ulary by removing, in a continued labor limae, the pleonastic expressions, con-
junctions, adverbs and all those grammatical elements that where not significant 
to the textual analysis. These discarded elements are called “token” units, while 
the ones that have to be considered are called “types” units
Concerning the analysis of the co-occurrences, Hypertext stands out as 
a central lemma not only for its frequency and repetition, but mostly for its 
“thematic weight” in the introductions. The diagram of the co-occurrences for 
the Hypertext lemma is represented below:
Radial diagram of the co-occurences for the lemma “Hypertext”.
As can be seen in the graph, the Hypertext lemma is closely associated with 
the lemmas realization and to construct referring to the act of constructing the 
hypertext’s path. The hypertext, being a metacognitive task, requires the abil-
ity of thinking in action. It also requires links between knowledge and for-
mal, informal and non-formal settings. In the introductions, there are frequent 
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co-occurrences of the word hypertext: these are linked to the indication of the 
used methods and the path that has been constructed and followed to obtain the 
final product
Being it the story of one’s own educational path, it’s an invitation to a nar-
ration through first-person connections, for me. The application of all the links 
between knowledge and the dimensions of here and now and there and then of 
one’s own educational path can give access to an emotionality and a feeling that is 
renewed in light of the required task. The hypertext is a synchronic-comparative 
analysis of the knowledge built up during the course of one’s own formative 
path, which is often modelled with a slide presentation in order to develop the 
network of the hypertext’s links.
Radial diagram of the co-occurrences for the lemma “Formation”.
This is the co-occurences graph for the significative lemma formation. This 
time, along with the evident and maybe predictable links with the three educa-
tional contexts/settings and the three sections of the hypertext (formal, informal 
and non-formal), the category of intentionality stands out thanks to the pres-
ence of the strong association with the word to intend.
This category is the pillar where didactics rise, under the architrave of the 
neurophenomenological perspective: in the educational relationship it acts both 
as an action intentionally oriented towards the individual and a formative goal, 
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and as a willful intentionality that the student shows in learning, something that 
the educator had already explored and implemented during his/her studies.
Moreover, the hypertext with its process by levels, just like formation 
in a broader way, elicits and represents a path of explicitness, a moment to 
identify and make one’s own educational intentionality object of reflection 
and self-reflection. The hypertextual experience supports the selection and 
connection between all the formative moments experienced by oneself, it of-
ten moves on multiple, synchronic and diachronic, comparative and analog-
ical levels.
The hypertext, then, with its process per stages (like formation, in a broad-
er way), elicits and represents a path of clarification, a moment to identify 
one’s own educational intentionality and make it an object of reflection and 
self-reflection. The hypertextual experience foster the selection of all the form-
ative moments experienced by the individual and it often moves on multiple 
synchronic and diachronic, comparative and analogical levels. The reflections 
emerging from the introductions of the hypertexts are, then, actual first-person 
metacognitive tales that, encouraged by the metacognitive grid, express the stu-
dent’s meta-reflection.
Radial diagram of co-occurences for the lemma “Experience”.
The dense word experience here has two meanings. On the one hand, it 
means to comprehend, through reflection, the whole educational path of the 
subject that will speak in first person (for_me) about his/her experience of for-
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mation. On the other hand, the hypertext itself is also a formative and metacog-
nitive experience constituting, through its different stages, a sort of metaphor 
of one’s own formative story.
The analysis of the co-occurences with the word experience highlights the 
emotional dimension inside the reflective task of the hypertext. In fact, the lat-
ter encourages to understand one’s life evolution in a formative way. There-
fore, the meaningful evolutionary moments take place in the informal set-
ting, in which they are reconnected (and re-identified) with the formal and the 
non-formal settings. The hypertext, then, is also an autobiographical narration 
that involves emotionality because treats one’s own bildung as conscious and 
intentional persons.
Radial diagram of the co-occurences for the “Reflection” lemma.
Lastly, an analysis of the co-occurrences for the lemma reflection, has been 
carried out. According to the neurophenomenological interpretation of the in-
tentionality, this is a key word in the hypertextual path: Reflecting, in student’s 
first-person words, is elicited by the task of preparing the hypertext.
Since the hypertext calls into questions its own models of formation, it also 
promotes, somehow, transformation and change: it’s helps people in becom-
ing aware of their theoretical perspectives and of all the internalized formative 
models.
This liberating push constitutes a flywheel and a reflective potentiality of 
the hypertext which requires critical and creative ability, in order to link and 
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question one’s own formative assumptions. It is an intense work facilitating, we 
would dare to say, a transformative learning (Mezirow, 1991), since it requires 
the revision of one’s meaning and epistemic perspectives and their revision in 
the dimension of the here and now. In this regard, we introduce an analysis of 
the intersections between the lemmas (hypertext and reflection), which results 
appear graphically represented by the bar chart below:*
The analysis of intersections between the lemmas has underlined the con-
junction between reflection and hypertext with respect to the task and to the 
experience lemma. This result recursively confirms the interdependence bond 
between reflecting on the experience and the hypertext, as a lemmatic triangu-
lation that systematically refers to the introductions of the students.
Said interconnection involves the autobiographical sphere, the experiences 
are re-lived because there is a space and a listening that allows to re-live pic-
tures and periods, formative models. One can also build knowledge, changing 
the patterns of the educational action. That is why the hypertext is a meta-re-
flexive tool, very efficient in the formation of the trainers. It stakes the feeling 
and knowing, in a process of shared construction of the meaning of one’s own 
formative story.
The analysis of the intersections between the lemmas hypertext and knowl-
edge, has highlighted other significant insights to understand the individual and 
* Co-occurrences: (A) Reflection, (AB), (B) Hypertext. Autobiography, Task, To build, To 
oppress, Learning, Sense, To change, Musical, To Re-do, To listen, Construction, To link, Listen-
ing, Manner, Experience, Knowledge, To ask, Necessary, Oppressed, First.
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shared metacognitive processes which are activated by the hypertext produc-
tion. The results of this second analysis process are graphically shown below.*
The research group, oriented by the intersections emerging from the analy-
sis of the introduction and from the scientific literature, decided to explore in 
depth the links both conceptual and expressly linguistic, between the hypertext 
and knowledge.
From the textual analysis of the lemmatic intersections resulted that the hy-
pertext activates a multifaceted construction, an implicit and potential capacity, 
probably until that moment not explicit and not aware so much that the most 
relevant core of the intersection is that related to the sphere of change.
This process of individual and shared construction of knowledge is ex-
pressed as a search for a common thread that holds together all the knowledge 
that oneself acquired in the formal, informal and non-formal settings, promot-
ing the acquisition of awareness about one’s life and formative experiences. It 
has to be noticed the presence of a lemmatic intersection between the words 
mind and connecting which helps us drawing a parallelism between the con-
nection of knowledge in the hypertextual lattice structure and the modeling of 
neural networks in which the cognitive development and the and restructuring 
of previous one’s acquisitions would reside.
* Co-occurrences: (A) Hypertext, (AB), (B) Knowledge. Thread, to keep, to cross, to con-
nect, reality, life, development, change, to build, awareness, words, to favour, to read, mind, own, 
series, informal, possible, capacity, conductor.
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Down below there is the analysis of the lemmatical intersections of other 
two important terms which are frequent in the produced metacognitive grids, 
hypertext and formation.*
It emerges from the graph how the experience finds its connotation while 
selecting the texts to be inserted in the three sections of the hypertext. The hy-
pertext experience can be considered as a process, one’s path of formation mov-
ing onto different levels because it promotes awareness of one’s fundamental 
educational models in life. It signifies and re-signifies these models because of 
their connections in the wider education path. Moreover, the hypertext makes 
explicit the ideas of education, man and of the processes of change which are 
promoted starting from the adhesion and the internalization of that model. It is 
like a disorienting dilemma (Mezirow, 1991), stressing and forcing us to think 
about our education, and how it has contributed in every phase of our life.
So, the difference between formal, informal and non-formal, appears even 
clearer to the participants, especially during the reflective and metacognitive 
phase of filling the metacognitive grid. There is a new chance to re-think about 
the practice in order to find a link with the theory.
Finally, it was carried out an analysis of the intersections between the lem-
mas formation and formal in order to see which conceptual and then textual 
* Co-occurrences: (A) Hypertext, (AB), (B) Formation. To contribute, life, dimension, idea, 
experience, informal, formal, education, to understand, consider, awareness, process, path, to fa-
vour, to identify, to change, levels, texts, to select, fundamental.
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interconnections could be revealed. The analysis of lemmas intersections ex-
plores the linguistic and consequently conceptual, nodes which are produced 
by the narratives. These nodes create interconnections between thoughts and 
emotional experiences that can be explained starting from their analysis. The 
purpose is to let the conceptual and emotional twists emerge spontaneously and 
automatically, non-intentionally from the participants reports. The lemmatic in-
tersections were analyzed only for the lemma formal starting from the reasoned 
methodological choice to take into consideration the setting of the hypertext 
task which is required in an academic and university setting. It provides for the 
integrative use of other techniques and methodologies, to support listening to 
oneself, to others and to the social context.*
The most relevant intersection between the lemmas formation and formal 
arises within the two interconnections of path and informal referring to the 
whole path of building the hypertext.
Moreover, for the first time we can notice a reference to the group, sharing 
one’s path with the university colleagues. The sharing of the hypertext con-
struction happened both while planning the hypertext, through comparisons, 
exchange of information, ideas, thoughts, and during the making of the latter. In 
fact, some students presented part of their hypertextual path to their classmates 
* Co-occurences: (A) Formal, (AB), (B) Formation. Informal, experience, process, idea, ma-
terial, song, awareness, book, to contribute, to allow, moment, passage, colleague, path, connec-
tion, to build, knowledge, phrase, leave, thread,
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and to the teacher who coordinates Lepe’s activities, in order to have feedback 
and comments on the progress of their production. In the graphical analysis 
presented above we outlined the knowledge and the references that have to be 
involved in the formal section such as the books and the most significant and 
emblematic phrases of theories or authors that students remind.
So, the hypertext becomes a space where one can think about the complexi-
ty of the plot given by formation and experience. It is a place to rediscover and 
find a new meaning compared to one’s past formation and to the years spent at 
school and university.
Psychology students’ grids reveal introspection and self-reflection abilities: 
they are particularly willing to work on themselves and their educational mod-
els, without leaving their emotions and affects. Concerning the functions of 
metacognition described above, it seems from the analysis of the hypertextual 
introductions that the overdetermined and more developed function is that of 
monitoring and integration.
Monitoring, which expresses oneself double ability to identify, recognize 
and define the different components of one’s own mental state (emotions and 
thoughts), and to establish a relationship between these internal components 
and the environmental or relational events describing causes and motivations 
of behaviour, is evident while one’s developing awareness and understanding 
of intentions, thoughts and of one’s hypertext leitmotiv path.
Students are able to describe their own formative path and to represent it 
when selecting the material and sharing it into the three sections.
On the one hand, the integration, the ability of reflecting on states and men-
tal contents, integrating them to each other even with other elements, is ex-
pressed in students’ skill to get an integrated vision of their mental states such 
as of any of their mental processes compared to the temporal sequences.
We find this last ability in the hypertexts’ organization with cohesive and 
consistent connections between the formal, informal and non-formal fields. In-
tegrating is useful to the following fundamental tasks: establishing hierarchies 
of relevance in the context of hypertext; clarify the relationship between the 
components of the three areas of hypertext; clearly express the different roles 
within the proposed materials. However, these results have to be extended and 
made more complex by the analysis of the questionnaires administered after the 
experience that we carried out.
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Being able to talk about transformative learning is necessary, in order to inves-
tigate from a biological point of view its conditions of possibility. The bio-ped-
agogy showed over time reading models of the learning processes of autono-
mous and heteronomous kind (Strollo, 2003). In the first case both the nature of 
the learning process that the possibility to intervene on it starting from the con-
ditions of the training setting are very limited, because the process of learning 
is determined by the genetic predispositions of cognitive structures that select 
between the stimuli coming from the environment those most significant for the 
structures themselves. In the second case, however, the learning process even in 
part conditioned by individual predispositions, depends more on socio-cultural 
environment, paving the way for educational interventions aimed at the trans-
formation. In physical and cultural contexts of belonging, man is never passive 
receptor of environmental stimuli that hurt him, but is an agent system set in 
relationships with other agents systems, modifying each other. The socio-cultural 
environment is the constructor and producer of mental structures, thus the edu-
cational process is not simply facilitated by environment products. In line with 
a heteronomous type model, in the neurophenomenological approach (Varela, 
1991; 1996), subjective schemes are not genetically determined, but they are 
definitely influenced by the types of beliefs and reasoning schemes available in 
the culture that surrounds the individual (Strollo, 2008). This, on one hand may 
anticipate the impact of contextual constraints, on the other opens the way for 
reflection on the transformative possibilities of educational practices, which 
may be dialogic interaction spaces where to revise mental habits, behaviors, 
taken for granted assumptions transversally to the multiple application contexts 
(Gordon, 2013). Varela (1979) defined the unity of autopoietic systems as or-
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ganized networks of the processes of transformation and destruction through 
which the system continuously regenerated and realized the processes or rela-
tions that produced it. Starting from these conceptual premises, neurophenom-
enology (Varela, 1991; 1996) offers a meaningful contribution to support the 
conditions of possibility where transformative learning (Mezirow, 2000; 2003) 
may occur. The core concept of the neurophenomenological reflection is the in-
tentionaly, which should be considered as the root of all human action, there-
fore, of the learning process and of the educational action. The central elements 
of the reflection on the intentionality find their theoretical roots in the phenom-
enology by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (Dreyfus, 1982), and their empirical 
roots in the neuroscientific studies on brain fuctioning (Rudrauf, Lutz, Cosmelli, 
Lachaux & Le Van Quyen, 2003; Lutz & Thompson, 2003). Those latter be-
sides using the traditional functional magnetic imaging resonance, adopting the 
virtual reality (Froese & Fuchs, 2012; Froese et al., 2014), which even if in ex-
perimental conditions, allows to identify with greater approximation the varia-
bles that impact on the process of action in contexts of real life. Considering 
these researches, neurophenomenology identifies the base of action modeling 
processes that are the principles of enaction, emergence and coevolution, which 
are rooted in Husserl’s theoretical categories of the Constitution, Implicit and 
Intersubjectivity (Strollo, 2008; 2014). The enaction implies that “the 
sensory-motor association shapes, but never in a deterministic way, the double 
endogenous activity representational and costructive in a time that it configures 
into meaningful world items in an unceasing flow” (Varela, 1999, p. 270). The 
enaction means that each human action (and each human action is an intention-
al experience) works only through sensory- motor acts. The enactive approach 
to perception is not only constrained by the environment, but contributes to its 
effective activation, so that the body at the same time gives shape to and is 
formed by the environment. In terms of methodology, it is possible to trace the 
adoption of a process very close to that proposed by the phenomenological tra-
dition, since the correlation between the subjective act and the objective data to 
which this act is aimed explains the separation between things and modes of 
manifestation of the things, the subjective perception of the acts explains the 
appearance of the independent reality of things, and vice versa. The starting 
point in the study of perception is not, therefore, a world that is given, inde-
pendent of the subject of perception, but the sensorimotor structure of the cog-
nitive agent, the way in which the nervous system connects the sensory and 
motor surfaces. The exterior, the environment, plays a disturbing function that 
resides at the origin of the activation of perception, but since it takes place in 
local situations and these are constantly changing, it is the sensory-motor struc-
ture that determines how that person can act and how it can be modulated by 
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environmental events. The emergency introduces the possibility of considering 
any action as characterized by the co- participation between different regions of 
the brain, which are functionally distinct and topographically distributed, and 
their sensorimotor embodiment. Recent surveys conducted in the field of neu-
roscience allowed to support the transition from a conception of the brain as 
modular, both from the topological that functional point of view, to one that 
sees it as active by means of the simultaneous action of fragments of modules 
communicating with each other for phenomena of ‘resonance’: the occurrence 
of a resonance between cognitive subsets that act simultaneously, even if dedi-
cated to specific differentiated functions, brings out “the cognitive configura-
tion of the subject at that precise moment” (Varela, 1990). The result is the ina-
bility to reconduct a global process, such as the conscious behavior, only to 
local rules that govern brain function: emergency, the specific cognitive config-
uration, manifests itself as a construction dependent on a relationship between 
the organism in a whole and the environment. Consequently, the traditional no-
tion of a cognitive agent, which collects information and makes decisions for 
subsequent actions is replaced by the concept of transient configuration that 
emerges “in a moment and disappears in the next moment, and this for every 
fraction of a second” (ibidem). The coevolution, connected to Husserl’s concept 
of intersubjectivity, concerns the ways of construction of models of actions: a 
reactive mode, a hedonistic mode and an eductive mode, reflecting the cogni-
tive levels that are driving the evolution of the human gender. The difference 
between the three constructive schemes depends on several cognitive factors 
that intervene in the processes of construction of actions: the reactive action 
does not require the use of particular cognitive strategies and allows to adapt to 
complex environments exclusively for very simple tasks. Sophisticated action 
carried out in an evolutionary environment require to process the action starting 
from one’s own experience, making reference to a principle of pleasure/dis-
pleasure. This is the hedonist level: by virtue of processes of self-reinforce-
ment, the agent works in advance and is able to build new strategies. But at the 
hedonistic level these action strategies are stiff and evolve slowly. The only 
way for an agent to change in real time unsuitable strategies is the eduction, 
which refers to the ability to mentally simulate future actions, without one’s 
own direct experience or imitation, and from patterns of one’s cognitive and 
symbolic dynamics, functional for the strategies to be implemented. The educ-
tion means, then, agent’s ability to simulate numerous cognitive trajectories, 
where it is necessary, and to realize a self-directed learning from these virtual 
trajectories (Strollo, 2008). The limit for an isolated agent is, however, the pos-
sibility to use only models of action built on the basis of his own experience: 
the only way to build models, based not only on the individual experience, lies 
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in the possibility of being able to make use of models built from the experience 
of others. This requires a new skill, the mirroring skill: thinking, modeling, rea-
soning in a given situation as well as the other would think, would model, 
would reason in the same situation. This is one of the main aspects of the con-
cept of mirroring, essential concept to analyze the cohesion of human societies. 
In dealing with a new situation the human being does not build models only in 
function of what is observed but also considering the way in which the other 
would build models in the same situation. One of the key points of education in 
enactive key is thus intersubjectivity, the complementarity of self and other in 
the processes. One of the distinctive elements of the higher primates would, in 
fact, be to excel in providing an interpretation of the other’s mind. This skill is 
a particular kind of intelligence, connected to the understanding of mental 
states, desires, intentions, and beliefs, based on the other’s bodily presence. The 
other is learned, therefore, not as an object but as another similar subjectivity, 
an alter ego, who shares the same organic structure embodied in the same vital 
field: this double dimension of the body, organic and lived, is the basis of train-
ing and of the human evolution, so understood in terms of co-evolution (Strollo, 
2008). The learning process, therefore, in the neurophenomenological approach 
is always a transformative process: the conditions of possibility of learning re-
side in the ability to manage metacognitively one’s own actions. About this 
conclusion the neurophenomenology has been working for years to build 
metacognitive strategies enabling subjects of experiments to report in first per-
son (Diaz, 2013) what happens to them in the laboratory. One of the peculiar 
elements of neurophenomenology is criticism of the reports in third person and 
of researchers’ reports, as a guide to the definition of what happens during the 
experiment (Varela, 1991; 1996; 1999). Hence the construction of paths that 
tend to form self-reflection about internal cognitive processes: these paths could 
be very interesting about the reflection on the possibility of a transformative 
learning (Mezirow, 2000) that makes individuals aware of their cognitive pro-
cesses, acting on the emergent elements that regards the implicit and working 
as emancipatory element from cultural imprinting. We will discuss about these 
strategies currently in use as well as being tested in the Laboratory of Educa-
tional Epistemology and Practices in the end of our contribution. How Neu-
rophenomenology Supports the Conditions of Necessity for Transformative 
Learning According to neurophenomenology, learning processes take place im-
plicitly and are strongly influenced by the culture in which they implement, so 
we should reflect on how individuals are truly free in their choice of action. The 
condition of possibility of the process of freedom of choice lies in making ex-
plicit our own learning processes and in the emancipation from the cultural im-
printing (Strollo, 2014). In this regard, neurophenomenology appears to present 
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numerous connections with the theory of transformative learning: the input that 
generates the transformation is in fact intended in neurophenomenology as a 
kind of confused problem (Merleau-Ponty, 1964), as a perturbation (Varela, 
1991) and as a disorienting dilemma (Mezirow, 2000). Merleau-Ponty (1964) 
defines input as a kind of confusing problem: the body and the environment, 
sentient and sensitive, are not facing each other, sensation is not the irruption of 
sensitive in sentient, but is the outcome of a coupling, a synchronization be-
tween inside and outside, where the outside, the environment poses to the body 
of the living subject a kind of confused problem, for which the subject is called 
to find the attitude that will give him way to self-determine under this stimulus. 
Varela (1991; 1996) talks about inputs such as disturbance, perturbation, which 
triggers an autopoietic process of defense, which responds to the input renovat-
ing the subjectivity in its entirety. The concept of “perturbing input” exceeds 
the learning vision in mechanistic terms opening up to a more problematic in-
terpretation of the person-environment relationship, according to which the en-
vironment, which also triggers strongly the dynamics of change, is “metabo-
lized through a device certainly much more intricate and complex then the 
adaptive operation” (Strollo, 2006). Mezirow speaks about input as disorient-
ing dilemma (Mezirow, 2000; 2003): the disorienting dilemma is a disturbing 
input that determines a time of uncertainty, estrangement, an “A-ha!” moment. 
The disorienting dilemma is something relevant to the mystery of learning, to 
that jump that when it is produced, requires the need to review our patterns of 
meaning. The disorienting dilemma is an acute, personal and internal crisis 
(Taylor, 2000), which refers to some problematic experiences, themed from 
current insights and reference frames. People feel a disorienting dilemma when 
they do not undertake an action or a change despite having experienced the 
transformation through the process of critical thinking and reflective discourse: 
in this case, they go through a gap between their values and reality. In the ten 
step precursors of transformative learning, the outcome is the commitment in 
new action, testing a road thus far never undertaken. Clearly, the growth of 
self-awareness, the discovery of the values, and the encounter with other people 
promote the mutual exchange of insights, perspectives and visions that can en-
hance transformative learning. The disorienting dilemmas are part of the com-
mon sense of the people, but they cannot be solved without understanding the 
ways in which the perception, thought and action distorted the way in which 
people have defined the problem and themselves in relation to it, in order to in-
crease the probability of transformation. This implies that individuals acquire 
an awareness of their ability to give shape to their lives and the ways in which 
they try to cope with the disorienting dilemmas that arise in their experiences. 
For both approaches, the condition of possibility for a transformative learning 
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resides into an input aiming at a reconfiguration of the previous cognitive struc-
tures, through a cognitive conflict that has resulted in an acquisition of metacog-
nitive knowledge of the ties that imprison people’s possibilities for action. In 
this regard the contribution of neurophenomenology can be further: neurophe-
nomenology and its implications in pedagogy provide as well as a theoretical 
support for the possibility and the need for a transformative learning, also prac-
tical strategies for its achievement. These strategies are currently tested in 
LEPE (Laboratory of Educational Epistemology and Practices) as well as in a 
number of contexts in which it is adopted the neurophenomenological approach 
to the study of learning processes and include:
• Mindfulness as awareness and training strategy for first-person reports (for 
the clarification of the internal processes) used in both neuroscience re-
search as well as in pedagogy (Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie & Varela, 2002; 
Dor-Ziderman et al., 2013; De Simone & Strollo, 2014; De Simone, Strollo 
& Romano, 2014; Lancaster, 2015; Kass, 2015);
• Metacognitive paths on the topic of the awareness of personal process of 
cultural formation.
In this regard, since 1999 it is used in LEPE a strategy designed to make 
users aware of the links between formal, informal and non-formal education, 
such as the hypertext: formal training means learning paths that take place in 
educational institutions and educational programs leading to the grant of recog-
nized diplomas and qualifications; informal learning is a corollary of the expe-
riences of everyday life, is not necessarily intentional and therefore can not be 
recognized even by individuals themselves as contributing to their knowledge 
and skills; non-formal learning means learning paths that take place outside of 
mainstream systems of education and training and does not typically lead to 
formalized certificates. Non-formal learning is dispensed in the workplace or 
in the framework of activities of organizations or civil society groups (youth 
associations, trade unions or political parties) (Source Memorandum on life-
long learning, SEC, 2000). The experience outcomes are reported in references 
sources (Strollo, 2008; 2014). Users through hypertext construction connect 
the three dimensions as starting point of the metacognitive awareness of the 
role that culture and environment play in the training process. Such awareness 
as appears from self-reports written by users generates awe and opens the way 
for a transformation aimed at achieving better management of the influence 
that culture plays on individual actions. This finds support in the reflection of 
the memes by Dawkins (Dawkins, 1976). The meme is an entity consisting of 
an information recognizable by the intellect (Strollo, 2008) on human culture, 
and that can be replicated by a mind or a symbolic memory support, for exam-
ple a book, to another mind or support. In more specific terms, a meme would 
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be a self-propagating unit of cultural evolution, analogous to what gene is for 
genetic, then an element of culture or civilization transmitted by non- genetic 
means, especially by imitation, in transgenerational sense. Memes are respon-
sible for the trans-generational cultural transmission. Hypertext, a kind of pres-
entation of the connection between formal, informal and non-formal education 
on personal training story, is therefore understood as a disorienting dilemma 
from which to gain awareness of the role played by cultural imprinting on indi-
viduals’ educational theory. The Laboratory of Educational Epistemology and 
Practices follows a different path than the most commonly used strategies as 
it does not depart from a biographical analysis of experience, but from a pre-
liminary systematization of knowledge around the educational process by a 
synchronic and comparative analysis of the training models. This analysis is 
preliminary to the choice and the explication of a pattern of action, explanation 
that happens through the construction of hypertext, intended as a device of revi-
sion of people’s educational work through the synchronic-comparative analysis 
of educational patterns of actions internalized. Between Neurophenomenology 
and Transformation, Future Perspectives The route presented intended to ex-
plore the contribution of neurophenomenology for transformative learning: the 
theory of autopoiesis (Varela, 1991) and of the embodied mind (ibidem) led to 
a paradigm shift in the approach to the complex relationship mind-body, un-
derstood as structuring elements of being in the world, in continuous autopoi-
etic co-determination, which organize all human experience. We can therefore 
assume that the encounter between neurophenomenology and transformative 
learning would bring a mutual enrichment, considering neurophenomenology 
as a foundational element of transformative learning dimension and Mezirow’s 
theory as an important instrument of strategies that enable precise first-person 
reports to be used in neurophenomenological trials. Neurophenomenology, in 
conclusion, not only substantiates (rooting it in the body) the questioning of the 
prospects of meaning on which it focuses the transformative learning theory, 
but provides the incarnated dimension of the opportunity to experiment new 
roles, after the review process, and to add in individuals’ conscious experience 
of new pattern of action. Therefore, our future recommendations is for a deep-
ening of the links that connect transformative learning theory and the embod-
ied-enactive conception of the knowledge, which is embodied in our body and 
embedded in our relations and in lived experience.
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F
S C I E N Z E  
D E L L A
FORMAZIONE
The book aims to present an action-research carried out with teachers and educators at
University of Naples “Federico II”: through the research and its results, it is possible to analyze
the nexus and the connections between phenomenology and cognitive sciences, in the training
of the educators, relating to the reflection about the category of intentionality in an educational
key. The intentionality, otherwise the deepest motivation pushing the action, is in fact conceived
as the “motor” of each educational process both for the trainers and for the subject in training.
Specifically, with our contribution, we focus on the three vectors of the phenomenological
inquiry on the category of intentionality: the process of construction, the characteristic of being
implicit, and the intersubjectivity. These three vectors impact on the interiorization and
promotion of ideals like democratic citizenship, global sensivity, and multiculturalism in the
process of construction of professional identity, particularly in the field of education and of the
formation of the educators. These three vectors are intended in the framework of the
neurophenomenological perspective, which aims to put together the philosophical inquiry with
the research in cognitive sciences. However, the purpose is to explore the consequences of this
conjunction on the pedagogical reflection on the concept of educational intentionality,
empirically showing how they influence the metacognitive processes of teachers and educators
during their training course. In order to evaluate empirically how teachers and educators would
develop metacogntive reflections about their professional identities and about their potential
and their opportunities to promote ideals in the children education, we adopt mixed
methodologies of research, using a structured questionnaire and the first-person narratives. The
data gathered with these two instruments are analyzed in a comparative way to find out
indications and directions to follow about the enactive implicit and co-evolutive dimensions of
the training of the facilitators and educators.
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